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2Abstract
Quantum information theory plays a role of not only a resource of advanced
technologies such as quantum cryptography, quantum computer, and so on,
but also a bridge between information science and physics. It is neces-
sary for remarkable development of scientic technology and engineering.
We focus on Mean King's problem which is a kind of quantum estimation
problems with delayed information. This problem is also interpreted as an
uncertainty principle among noncommutative observables with delayed in-
formation. That is, if Mean King's problem is solved with several methods,
it induces improvement of the precision of the measurements with the de-
layed information in the experimental setting corresponding to the problem.
A purpose of research shown in this thesis is to give new information sci-
entic insights to the problem and to obtain novel knowledge about the
problem. Specically, we show a solution to the problem using quantum
error-correcting codes and reformulate the problem using Shannon entropy.
We also consider the relationship between solutions to the problem and se-
curity of quantum key distribution with the problem.
Mean King's problem is told as a tale that mean King gives physicist
Alice a retrodiction problem, and is constructed form the following steps:
1) Alice's preparation of an initial quantum state, 2) King's measurement,
3) Alice's measurement, 4) Revealing the measurement employed by King
as a delayed information, 5) Estimating King's outcome with Alice's out-
come and the delayed information. In this problem, we try to nd a pair
of an initial state and a measurement employed by Alice such that she can
estimate King's outcome perfectly. This problem is solved in several set-
tings, for instance, generalization of King's measurements, preparation of
entanglement as an initial state, and so on. The problem is also applied to
quantum key distribution protocol as which is a technique to share secret
keys used for one-time pad cryptosystem. Security analysis of the protocol
is studied against several attack models. In this way, both of the problem
and the protocol are studied in the previous works. However, those works
are results from viewpoints of physics and information science, respectively.
In the thesis, we show three main results. As the rst result, we show
a solution to general Mean King's problem using quantum error-correcting
codes which are a technique to prevent disturbing of quantum states on
quantum communications, and so on. We also prove existence of solutions
of the problem in several cases. Furthermore, we extend classes of settings of
the problem solved using the above solution method. As the second result,
we reformulate Mean King's problem using Shannon entropy and introduce
an alternative proof of nonexistence of solutions to the problem in a case of
qubit system without quantum entanglement. In the last result, we modify
measurement scheme in the quantum key distribution protocol using Mean
King's problem, and consider security of the protocol against several attacks.
3As a result, we show that solving Mean King's problem is necessary but not
sucient to construct secure quantum key distribution protocols. Making
an outline of something, from the rst and the second results, we give new
informational scientic insights to Mean King's problem from viewpoints of
quantum coding theory and information theory. From the last result, we give
a new physical insight to security analysis of the quantum key distribution
protocols from a viewpoint of the quantum estimation problems.
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Notation
 C and R denote complex numbers and real numbers, respectively.
 F2 = f0; 1g denotes the prime eld with characteristic number 2.
 i denotes the imaginary unit.
 e denotes the Napier's constant.
 a := b denotes \a is dened as b ".
 8 denotes \for any ".
 9 denotes \there exist(s) ". 9! denotes \there uniquely exist(s) ".
 For a complex number ,  denotes the complex conjugate of .
 For a matrix T and a vector x, T> and x> denote the transpose of T
and x, respectively.
 For a matrix T and a vector x, T and x denote the complex conjugate
of T and x, respectively.
 For a vector space V , dimV denotes the dimension of V .
 For a subset W of a vector space V over C, spanW denotes the sub-
vector space spanned by W .
 For an ordered set A, maxA denotes the maximum element of A.
 For an ordered set A, supA denotes the supremum element of A.
 For an ordered set A, inf A denotes the inmum element of A.
 logb() denotes logarithm function with base b, especially log() denotes
logarithm function with base 2.
 j  j denotes absolute value.
 For vector spaces V and V 0, V ' V 0 denotes \V is isomorphic to V 0".
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Back Ground
Engineering has made remarkable development in the twentieth century. In
particular, software engineering and materials engineering play crucial roles.
We focus on materials engineering. The eld has been applied to hardware
industry such as semiconductors, integrated circuits, and so on as it is devel-
oped. On the other hand, software engineering has been applied to software
industry such as information systems, software applications, and so on as it
is developed. As seen from the above, applications of those engineerings are
indispensable to carrying out life in society. However, we should review the
engineerings and give new insights to them if stagnation of progress of them
is shown. Indeed, it is expected that there is a limit of the progress of hard-
ware industry in the conventional thoughts and methodology, e.g., a limit
of integration of electronic circuits, a limit of low power consumption, and
so on. For further evolution, we suggest consideration of information sci-
ence applied to software engineering from a viewpoint of physics applied to
materials engineering to researchers of industry and engineering, and vice
versa. Thus, we hope that novel theory, engineering, and technology are
developed from the combined elds. To do so, we need paradigm shift in en-
gineering and science. Quantum information theory could be a solution for
the purpose. Quantum information theory serves to bridge a gap between
physics and information science on the basis of probabilistic theory. Thus,
the theory gives new physical insight to information science and also gives
new information scientic insight to physics conversely.
Electronic devices are treated as black boxes when we design informa-
tion systems, i.e., we focus on only inputs and outputs of the devices and
disregard microscopic changes in the devices. However, the smaller the de-
vices and its circuits become, the more important the changes become. Such
changes interpreted as phenomena in quantum physics are called quantum
eects. It is expected that performance of whole information system could
11
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be enhanced if we made active use of quantum eects for designing the
system. Generally, quantum information theory is a eld of study where
quantum eects are used for wide variety of areas such as information pro-
cessing, computation, and so on. However, it has no consensus of denition
of the theory. Quantum information theory made progress as not a part
of quantum physics but a role of a resource of future technologies. Indeed,
experts of cryptography focused on the theory when quantum cryptogra-
phy was introduced in 1984. Furthermore, many researchers of computation
theory, information theory, mathematical science, physics, and so on have
been studying quantum information theory since an amazing quantum al-
gorithm was introduced and computational power of quantum computation
was predicted in 1994.
Quantum cryptography was introduced by Bennett and Brassard in 1984
[1]. The proposed technique is a combination of quantum key distribution
and one-time pad cryptosystem. Quantum key distribution is a kind of
schemes of sharing secret keys used for symmetric cryptography by using
quantum eects of qubit systems. No one generally distinguish quantum
states of qubit systems in principle. Therefore, an eavesdropper cannot
gain information from encoded qubit systems according to secret keys on
a quantum channel. Thus , it is expected that quantum key distribution
could be unconditional security against any eavesdropper. Most famous
and impactful quantum algorithm was introduced by Shor in 1994 [2]. Non
quantum useful techniques for factorization of large size integer are not
known. However, we can factorize large size integer in realistic time by
using the algorithm on quantum computer. In quantum physics, we can
prepare one quantum system in two kinds of quantum states probabilisti-
cally and simultaneously. This principle is called quantum superposition.
Quantum superposition enables us to realize massively parallel computing.
Shor's algorithm using quantum superposition is implemented on quantum
computer. Feasibility of quantum computer is not known. However, the
impact of quantum computer and Shor's algorithm on society is great since
several cryptosystems are easily deciphered by using the techniques.
Quantum information theory became popular and also had a positive im-
pact on quantum physics as its applied technologies were suggested. Quan-
tum teleportation which sounds too good to be true was introduced in 1993
[3]. This technique enables us to transmit any quantum state from one lo-
cation to another. Basic quantum teleportation is realized with so called
EPR state (later it is called Bell state) which is a kind of quantum en-
tangled states. In quantum physics, EPR state plays a crucial role of so
called EPR paradox. In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen introduced
the paradox as a claim against quantum physics [4]. They claimed that
quantum physics is not perfect even if quantum physics is correct. They
also believed that there is a theory with which we can describe element
of reality perfectly. However, it was shown that their claim is wrong with
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accepting entanglement. Thus, quantum entanglement is sensitive subject
and requires careful handling over the years. However, the subject was re-
considered as the applied technologies such as quantum teleportation were
introduced. Moreover, new fundamental subjects such as separability of en-
tanglement, a boundary between quantum physics and Newtonian physics
from a viewpoint of entanglement, and so on have been being considered. In
this manner, both of applied subjects and fundamental subjects in quantum
information theory are important and interesting. Furthermore, the theory
is an example of bridges between science and engineering, and plays an es-
sential role as a future resource for remarkable progress of both of science
and engineering.
We focus on quantum estimation problems because the problems have
aspects as a fundamental subject, an applied subject, furthermore, reading
of information be condensed to the problems. Indeed, there is no method of
reading information from objects except for identifying information by esti-
mating the objects. In quantum physics, as we mentioned the above, we can-
not distinguish quantum states of quantum systems in generally. Thus, we
cannot estimate quantum states (information is possibly encoded to them)
perfectly by distinguishing the quantum states. However, it is considered
whether we can estimate or distinguish the states partially with allowing
error probability. Those problems are considered as so called quantum
hypothesis testing, discrimination of quantum states problem, and so on.
Those subjects are closely to allied subjects or fundamental subjects such as
quantum communications and quantum uncertainty principles, respectively.
In this thesis, we study Mean King's problem as a kind of quantum
estimation (discrimination or distinguishing) problems with delayed infor-
mation. In 1987, Vaidman, Aharonov, and Albert introduced Mean King's
problem as a challenge to an uncertainty principle among noncommutative
observables [5]. In the proposed setting, the problem is told as a tale that
mean King and physicist Alice play their roles: King asks Alice to prepare
qubit system (two-level quantum system) in an arbitrary quantum state.
King measures the system with a measurement corresponding to one of three
observables. Alice is permitted to measure the post measurement state once
with an arbitrary measurement. After Alice's measurement, King reveals
the kind of observable employed by him to Alice. Then, Alice should retro-
dict King's outcome by using her outcome and the kind of observable. It is a
problem to construct a pair of an initial quantum state and a measurement
employed by Alice such that she estimates King's outcome with probability
1, in which case we say that there exists a solution to the problem. Mean
King's problem has two aspects of a pre- and post-selected model and an
uncertainty principle with delayed information. As the rst aspect, we try to
give value 1 to conditional probability that King obtains an outcome given a
pair of a pre-selected state (an initial state) and a post-selected state (a sate
after Alice measures the system). Recently, the pre- and post-selected mod-
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els are studied as weak measurements, strong measurements, and so on. As
the second aspect, we try to decrease uncertainty among noncommutative
observables employed by King with delayed information. Note that we can
estimate King's outcome perfectly if the observables are commutative with
one another. Mean King's problem is interpreted as a problem that we try to
eliminate uncertainty of measuring precision with the delayed information.
In the original setting, Mean King's problem was solved by using Bell
state as an initial state. In this case, Alice prepares a bipartite system
and sends one of the systems to King. She measures the bipartite sys-
tem in the post measurement state. Many other studies were introduced
(later, we introduce the details in Chapter 6) in several settings: gener-
alized King's measurements, state preparations with entanglement, state
preparations without entanglement. However, the problem in those related
works was considered only as a kind of physical problems. In 2001, Bub
introduced a quantum key distribution protocol using Mean King's problem
[6]. In the protocol, Alice and King try to share secret key used for one-time
pad cryptosystem. Alice obtains an outcome as a result of estimation of
King's outcome in the problem. Alice and King can share same outcome if
Alice can estimate King's outcome perfectly. Then, they share secret key
transposed from the outcomes. In the related works, security of the protocol
was analyzed against several attack models (later, we introduce the details
in Chapter 6). Those works are interesting and important as security anal-
yses of quantum key distribution protocols. However, it is not said that
physical signicance of the results is claried.
1.2 Research Results
A purpose of the thesis is to give new information scientic insights to
Mean King's problem, and new physical insights to quantum key distribution
protocol using the problem. Thus, we show novel solutions to the general
Mean King's problem and consider physical signicance of the quantum key
distribution using Mean King's problem. In this thesis, we introduce three
main results for this purpose.
As the rst result, we clarify the relationship between Mean King's prob-
lem and quantum error-correcting codes which are a technique used for
guaranteeing performance of quantum communication, computation, and so
on. We show a solution of general Mean King's problem by using quantum
error-correcting codes. By interpreting King's measurements as an error on
the initial state, we show that the state is a quantum error-correcting code
against the error and a kind of error detection gives one of the solutions of
Mean King's problem. Existence of our solution is shown for prime-power
dimensional quantum systems. By constructing the problem solved by our
solution method from any orthonormal bases, we expand the class of setting
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of the problem that the solution exists.
As the second result, we reformulate Mean King's problem from a view-
point of Shannon entropy. We can naturally characterize the solution by
means of the zero conditional entropy of King's outcome given Alice's out-
come and kind of King's measurement. As its application, we give an proof
of nonexistence of solutions of Mean King's problem for qubit setting with-
out using any entangled state.
As the last result, we propose and analyze modied quantum key distri-
bution protocols using Mean King's problem. Note that the above original
protocol proposed by Bub employs Alice's measurement that can solve Mean
King's problem for three observables, while the protocol uses only a pair of
observables. We propose three protocols using simplied observables that
solve Mean King's problem for a pair of observables by using the solution
method given in the rst result. We analyze security of the protocols against
three attack models. We show that two of the protocols are insecure against
rather simple attacks. It means that not all the solutions of Mean King
problem for the pair of observables are available for secure quantum key
distribution. On the other hand, nontrivial information-disturbance theo-
rems, which mean that no one can gain information from quantum systems
without disturbing quantum state of the system, holds for the original pro-
tocol and one of proposed protocols. That is, the protocols could be secure
against the attack models.
1.3 Thesis Overview
This thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter, we remind math-
ematical materials to introduce quantum information theory. In Chapter
3, we introduce quantum information theory from a viewpoint of axioma-
tism of quantum physics. In Chapter 4 and 5, we review basics of quantum
error-correcting codes and quantum cryptography, and also review modern
coding theory and modern cryptography. In Chapter 6, we introduce con-
ventional setting of Mean King's problem and a quantum key distribution
protocol using the problem. We introduce main results after the Chapter
6. In Chapter 7, we derive a solution of general Mean King's problem using
quantum error-correcting codes as the rst main result. In Chapter 8, the
problem is reformulated from a viewpoint of Shannon entropy as the second
main result. In Chapter 9, we analyze security of the protocol and derive
several information disturbance theorems as the third main result. Finally,
in Chapter 10, we summarize this thesis.
Chapter 2
Mathematical Materials
2.1 Hilbert Space and Linear Operator
We review Hilbert spaces, linear operators, and its properties 1 . Let V be
a complex vector space. A map (; ) : V V ! C is called an inner product
2 if the followings hold:
1. (x; y + z) = (x; y) + (x; z); 8;  2 C; 8x; y; z 2 V;
2. (x; y) = (y; x); 8x; y 2 V;
3. (x; x)  0; 8x 2 V;
4. (x; x) = 0 if and only if x = 0; 8x 2 V:
Remark that the above condition 1 is dierent from a condition in linear
algebra 3 as a matter of principle of physics. We dene a norm kk := (; )1=2
using the inner product．Let E = feigdi=1 be a base of d dimensional complex
vector space. E is called an orthonormal base (ONB) if (ei; ej) = ij holds,
where ij : (i; j) 7! k 2 f0; 1g so called Kronecker delta is dened as ij = 1
for i = j and ij = 0 for i 6= j.
Denition 1 A complex vector space H is called a (complex) Hilbert space
if an inner product is equipped on H and H is complete 4 for a norm dened
by the inner product.
Throughout this thesis, complex vector spaces and Hilbert spaces are
nite dimensional spaces.
1For more details, see Ref.[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
2For sets A and B, direct sum of A and B is described as AB := f(a; b) j a 2 A; b 2
Bg. For vector spaces, we use the notation in a similar way.
3In linear algebra, the condition 1 is (x+y; z) = (x; z)+(y; z); 8;  2 C;8x; y; z 2
V .
4H is called complete if limn;m!1 kan   amk = 0 holds for an arbitrary sequence of
vectors (al)l, then there exists a 2 H such that limn!1 kan   ak = 0.
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In quantum physics, Dirac's bra-ket notation is used for describing a
vector. Let H be a Hilbert space. jxi is called a ket vector for a vector
x 2 H and a bra vector hxj denotes the dual vector 5 for x. We describe an
inner product with bra-ket notation:
hxjyi := hxj(jyi) = (x; y);
for x; y 2 H.
T : H ! H is called a linear operator on H if T (jxi+ jyi) = T jxi+
T jyi holds for any jxi; jyi 2 H and ;  2 C. Dene a trace
trT :=
X
i
heijT jeii;
where feigi is an ONB of H and hxjTyi = hxjT jyi := (jxi; T jyi). Remark
that
P
iheijT jeii =
P
ihfijT jfii for any ONBs feigi and ffigi. Trace has the
following properties: (1) trTR = trRT , (2) tr(T + R) =  trT +  trR,
for any operators T;R and ;  2 C.
Let T be a linear operator on a Hilbert space H. A linear operator T y
on H is called an adjoint operator of T if
(jxi; T jyi) = (T yjxi; jyi); 8jxi; jyi 2 H;
holds. Using the above notation, the dual vector for T jxi is hTxj = hxjT y.
Remark that there uniquely exists the adjoint operator for a xed linear
operator. This is shown using the Riesz representation theorem. We can
prove the following properties for any linear operators T and R easily:
1. (T +R)y = T y +Ry;
2. (T )y = T y; 8 2 C;
3. (TR)y = RyT y;
4. (T y)y = T:
Note that we dene operations on the set of operators on H: (T R)jxi :=
T jxiRjxi; T jxi := T jxi for any jxi 2 H, and TR := T R (composite
map of T and R).
Denition 2 A linear operator T is called an Hermitian operator if T = T y
holds.
Denition 3 A linear operator P is called a projection (operator) if P =
P y = P 2 holds, where P 2 := PP .
5Dene x : y 2 H 7! (x; y) 2 C for x 2 H, then the map x is called the duel vector
for x.
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Denition 4 A linear operator T is called a positive operator (we use the
notation T  0) if hxjT jxi  0 holds for any jxi 2 H.
Remark that T is a positive operator if the operator is a projection, and R
is an Hermitian operator if the operator is a positive operator.
Figure 2.1: Relationship among classes of operators
Denition 5 A linear operator U is called a unitary operator if U y U = I
holds, where I is the identity operator 6 on H
Remark that U y U = UU y = I holds for any unitary operator U .
Lastly, a linear map jxihyj for jxi; jyi 2 H is dened by jxihyjjzi :=
jxihyjzi = hyjzijxi. This denition is interpreted as (1) the operator jxihyj
acts on the vector jzi, (2) the vector jxi is multiplied by the complex number
hyjzi.
2.2 Tensor Product Hilbert Space
Let H1 and H2 be d1 dimensional and d2 dimensional Hilbert spaces, re-
spectively. Dene
jxi 
 jyi : (jui; jvi) 2 H1H2 7! hxjuihyjvi 2 C;
for jxi 2 H1 and jyi 2 H2. We use often the abbreviated notation jxi
jyi =
jxijyi = jxyi. Dene H1
H2 spanned by fjxi 
 jyi j jxi 2 H1; jyi 2 H2g
with the following properties:
1. (jxi 
 jyi) = (jxi)
 jyi = jxi 
 (jyi); 8 2 C;
2. (jx1i+ jx2i)
 jyi = jx1i 
 jyi+ jx2i 
 jyi;
3. jxi 
 (jy1i+ jy2i) = jxi 
 jy1i+ jxi 
 jy2i:
We dene an inner product equipped on H1
H2:
(jx1i 
 jy1i; jx2i 
 jy2i) := hx1jx2ihy1jy2i:
We use the abbreviated notation (jx1i
jy1i; jx2i
jy2i) = (hx1j
hy1j)(jx2i

jy2i) = hx1y1jx2y2i, where hx1j 
 hy1j denotes the dual vector of jx1i 
 jy1i.
Then, H1
H2 is a d1d2 dimensional Hilbert space with the above inner
6I is called the identity operator on H if I jxi = jxi holds for any jxi 2 H.
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product, and we call H1
H2 a tensor product Hilbert space for H1 and
H2. Let fjeiigd1i=1 and fjfjigd2j=1 be ONBs of H1 and H2, respectively. Then,
fjeii 
 jfjigd1;d2i;j=1 is an ONB of H1
H2, thus H1
H2 is d1d2 dimensional
space.
Let T1 and T2 be linear operators on H1 and H2, respectively. Dene a
linear operator T 
R on H1
H2:
T1 
 T2(jxi 
 jyi) := T1jxi 
 T2jyi:
Note that linear operators on H1
H2 have properties similar to linear op-
erator on H1 (H2), Furthermore, (T1 
 T2)(R1 
R2) = T1R1 
 T2R2; (T1 

T2)
y = T1 y
T2 y, and trT1 
 T2 = trT1 trT2 hold especially.
Remark that the above discussion is generalized n times tensor product
Hilbert space naturally such as H1
H2
    
Hn; jx1i 
 jx2i 
    
 jxni,
and T1 
 T2 
    
 Tn.
2.3 An Example: A Simple Construction
We introduce a basic complex vector space as follow:
Cd :=
8>>><>>>:
0BBB@
u1
u2
...
ud
1CCCA ui 2 C
9>>>=>>>; :
Dene an inner product on Cd by hxjyi := Pdi=1 xiyi, where jxi =
(x1; x2; : : : ; xd)
>; jyi = (y1; y2; : : : ; yd)> 2 Cd. Then, the dual vector
of jxi has the following form: hxj = ( x1; x2; : : : ; xd). Dene a norm
kjxik := hxjxi1=2 by using the above inner product, then, Cd is a d dimen-
sional Hilbert space with the inner product. Remark that Cd is isomorphic
7 to a d dimensional abstract Hilbert space H for a xed base.
As is easily shown, any d-by-d matrix on C is linear operator on Cd. Let
T be a d-by-d matrix. The conjugate transpose matrix of T is the adjoint
matrix (operator) of it, i.e., T y = ( T )>. Especially, the adjoint matrix of
jxihyj = (xi yj)ij has the following form: jyihxj = (yi xj)ij . Furthermore,
several operations of the matrices, e.g., addition, multiplication, and trace
8, are corresponded to operations of linear operators on Cd.
In a d dimensional Hilbert space Cd, the following product so called
Kronecker product is a tensor product:
jxi 
 jyi := (x1y1; : : : ; x1yd; x2y1; : : : ; x2yd; : : : ; xdy1;    ; xdyd)>;
7There exists a linear one-to-one map (bijection) from Cd to H.
8trT =
P
i tii holds for a matrix T = (tij)ij .
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for jxi = (x1; x2; : : : ; xd)> and jyi = (y1; y2; : : : ; yd)> 2 Cd, and
T 
 S :=
0BBB@
t11S t12S : : : t1dS
t21S t22S : : : t2dS
...
...
...
...
td1S td2S : : : tddS
1CCCA ;
for d-by-d matrices T = (tij)ij and S = (sij)ij . Then, jxi 
 jyi is a vector
of d2 dimensional Hilbert space Cd
Cd and T 
 S is a d2-by-d2 matrix.
2.4 Shannon Entropy and Mutual Information
We consider security criteria of conventional and quantum cryptography
described by entropy and mutual information. Cryptography guaranteeing
such like security criteria is called cryptography guaranteeing uncondition-
ally security or informational security. Information theory 9 was formulated
by Shannon in 1948 [16] 10. \Information" is quantied by using probability
corresponding to the event in information theory. It is a basic idea that
information of an event not tending to take place is greater than them of
typically events.
Denition 6 Let X be a (discrete) random variable and PX the probability
mass function relevant to X. Dene
H(X) :=  
X
x2X
PX(x) logb PX(x);
where we dene 0 logb 0 = 0. We call H() an entropy function and call
value of H(X) entropy or information for X
Particularly, H() is used for measuring bit if base of the logarithm is equal
to 2. Remark that H(X) is maximized for uniform distribution PX(x), i.e.,
PX(x) = PX(x
0) for any x and x0. Therefore, entropy denotes uncertainty
of events by using a random variable corresponding to them. Let X and Y
be (discrete) random variables, PX;Y (x; y) and PX;Y (x j y) joint probability
and conditional probability relevant to X and Y , respectively. Dene a
conditional entropy
H(X j Y ) :=  
X
x2X
X
y2Y
PX;Y (x; y) logb PX;Y (x j y);
and a joint entropy
H(X;Y ) :=  
X
x2X
X
y2Y
PX;Y (x; y) logb PX;Y (x; y);
9For more details, see Ref.[13, 14, 15]
10Recently, the paper is summarized in Ref.[17]
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for X and Y . Remark that H(X;Y ) = H(X) + H(Y j X) holds. This
equality is called the chain rule.
Denition 7 Let X and Y be (discrete) random variables and PX;Y the
joint probability relevant to X and Y . Dene
I(X;Y ) :=
X
x2X
X
y2Y
PX;Y (x; y) logb
PX;Y (x; y)
PX(x)PY (y)
;
where PX(x) :=
P
y2Y PX;Y (x; y) and PY (y) :=
P
x2X PX;Y (x; y). We call
I(; ) an mutual information.
We introduce several properties:
I(X;Y ) = H(X) H(X j Y ) (2.1)
= H(Y ) H(Y j X)
= H(X) +H(Y ) H(X;Y )
= H(X;Y ) H(X j Y ) H(Y j X)
From eq.(2.1), mutual information I(X;Y ) denotes dierence between un-
certainty of X and uncertainty of it on condition that information of Y is
given. In other words, I(X;Y ) denotes remaining uncertainty of X by ob-
taining information of Y . Note that I(X;Y ) = 0 holds if and only if X and
Y are independent.
Chapter 3
Preliminary of Quantum
Information Theory
3.1 Axioms of Quantum Information Theory
Axiomatism is embraced in quantum information theory (quantum physics)
1. Quantum systems, quantum states, several measurements, time evolu-
tion, and so on, are described by using Hilbert spaces and linear operators
on the spaces. Throughout this paper, we deal with only nite level quan-
tum systems. This request is sucient to discuss applied technologies such
as quantum cryptography, quantum error-correcting codes, quantum com-
putation, and so on.
Axiom 1 Associated to any d-level quantum system is described by a d di-
mensional Hilbert space and any d dimensional Hilbert space corresponds to
a d-level quantum system. Any quantum state of a quantum system described
by a unit vector of the Hilbert space associated with the quantum system.
That is, we identify quantum systems (resp. quantum states of the sys-
tems) with Hilbert spaces (resp. unit vectors of the spaces) 2 in quantum
information theory.
An action to obtain an outcome relevant to an observable from a quan-
tum system is called a measurement relevant to the observable.
1There are many textbooks and papers about quantum physics, quantum information
theory, and its applied technologies. We introduced typical and recommended books and
paper. Quantum physics: Ref.[18, 19, 20, 21]. Especially, probabilistic and statistical
aspects of quantum physics is shown in Ref.[22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. Quantum information
theory: Ref.[27, 28, 29, 30]. Quantum computer, communication, and cryptography:
Ref.[31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36].
2In quantum physics, it is not postulated that there exists a quantum system associated
with any Hilbert space.
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Axiom 2 An observable is described by an Hermitian operator 3 . We pre-
pare a quantum system H in a quantum state jxi and measure it with mea-
surement corresponding to an observable described by an Hermitian operator
A on H. Then, we obtain an outcome i with probability given by
hxjPijxi;
where i is an eigenvalue of A and Pi is the projection to the eigenspace of
i, i.e., spectral decomposition of A has the following form: A =
P
i iPi .
Figure 3.1: A measurement corresponding to an observable A on a quantum
system in a quantum state jxi
Disturbance of quantum states introduced by measurements is generally
unavoidable in principle of quantum physics. Variation of quantum states
such like the disturbance is called measurement process. We introduce a
typical measurement process. Suppose that we measure a quantum system
H in a quantum state jxi with an observable A = Pi iPi and obtain an
outcome i. If the post measurement quantum state of H is described by
Pijxi
kPijxik ;
this measurement is called a projective measurement 4 .
Time revolution of a quantum state is described by a unitary operator.
Axiom 3 Let jx1i be a quantum state of a quantum system H. Time evo-
lution of the state is described by a relevant unitary operator U on H:
jx2i = U jx1i;
where jx2i denotes the quantum state after the time evolution.
We also postulate that time evolution described by any unitary operator is
feasible.
In the above discussion, we deal with only one quantum system. We use
tensor product Hilbert spaces for describing composite quantum systems.
3Furthermore, we identify an Hermitian operator with an observable.
4A projective measurement for a non degenerate observable is called a von Neumann's
projective measurement. On the other hand, a projective measurement for a degenerate
observable is called a Luders's projective measurement. The measurement processes of
the projective measurements are called projective postulate.
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Figure 3.2: A time evolution corresponding to a unitary operator U
Axiom 4 Let S1 and S2 be quantum systems described by Hilbert spaces H1
and H2, respectively. A bipartite composite quantum system of S1 and S2 is
described by a tensor product space H1
H2.
Figure 3.3: A bipartite quantum system consists of quantum systems H1
and H2
For example, jxi 
 jyi 2 H1
H2 denotes that H1 and H2 are pre-
pared in the state jxi and jyi respectively, a measurement relevant to an
observable A1
A2 on H1
H2 denotes that H1 and H2 are measured with
A1 and A2 separately, a measurement relevant to an observable A1 
 I on
H1
H2 denotes that only H1 is measured with A1. Remark that we can
generalize the axiom to multipartite composite quantum systems such as
H1
H2
    
 Hn.
3.2 Generalizations
Let us consider that we prepare a state jxji 2 H with probability pj . In the
situation, we measure the quantum system with an observable A =
P
i iPi,
then, probability of obtaining i is given byX
j
pjhxijPijxii = trPi
X
j
pj jxjihxj j:
For a linear operator , the following conditions are equivalent: (1)  has the
following form
P
j pj jxjihxj j for some probability (pj)j and states (jxji)j ,
(2)   0 and tr  = 1 hold.
Denition 8 A linear operator  is called a density operator if   0 and
tr  = 1 hold.
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We can identify a density operator with a probabilistic mixture quantum
state. Therefore, rewriting the axiom, probability of obtaining an outcome
i when a quantum system in a state  is measured with A =
P
i iPi is
given by 5
tr Pi:
We can also rewrite the axiom of time evolution for a density operator t:
t+1 = UtU
y;
where t+1 denotes the density operator after the time evolution.
Let 1 and 2 be density operators. A convex combination 12 = t1 +
(1   t)2 for 0  t  1 is a density operator, i.e., 12  0 and tr 12 = 1
hold. Let S(H) be the set of density operators on H, i.e.,
S(H) := f j   0; tr  = 1g:
Note that S(H) is a convex set for the reasons stated above.  2 S(H) is
called a pure state if there do not exist 1; 2(6= ) 2 S(H) and 0 < t < 1
such that  = t1 + (1  t)2, i.e.,  is an extreme point of S(H).  2 S(H)
is called a mixture state if  is not a pure state. Remark that the following
conditions are equivalent: (1)  2 S(H) is a pure state, (2) there exits a
unit vector jxi 2 H such that  = jxihxj.
Figure 3.4: The set of all quantum states in a quantum systemH as a convex
set
Let HA and HB be Hilbert spaces expressing quantum systems, respec-
tively and AB a density operator on HA
HB expressing a quantum state
on the bipartite system. Then, we use partial trace for describing a quantum
state on HA (resp. HB).
Theorem 9 Let HA
HB be a bipartite system and AB 2 S(HA
HB) a
quantum state. There exists a quantum state A 2 S(HA) such that
tr(AB(M 
 IB)) = tr(AM); (3.1)
holds for any M 2 L(H).
5Remind that tr Pi = trPi holds.
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Indeed,
A :=
X
i1;i2;j
jei1ihei1fj jABjei2fjihei2 j;
satises eq.(3.1) and it is a density operator onHA, where fjeiigi and fjfjigj
are ONBs of HA and HB, respectively. In a similar way, there exists B 2
S(HB) for AB 2 S(HA
HB). We call A (resp. B) partial trace 6 and
we use a notation trB AB := A (resp. trA AB := B).
We can generalize measurement and time evolution by using unitary op-
erators and Hermitian operators on composite quantum systems 7 . Firstly,
we discus generalized feasible measurements as follow.
Denition 10 An n-tuple of linear operators (Mi)
n
i=1 is called a (discrete)
positive-operator-valued measure (POVM) if
Pn
i=1Mi = I and Mi  0 hold
for any i .
Denition 11 An n-tuple of linear operators (Ni)
n
i=1 is called a (discrete)
projection-valued measure (PVM) if
Pn
i=1Ni = I holds and Ni is a projec-
tion for any i .
Remark that the set of PVMs is a subset of the set of POVMs since any
projection is a positive operator. A measurement with a POVM (resp.
PVM) (Mi)
n
i=1 in a state  is called a POVM (resp. PVM) measurement,
then a probability of obtaining an ith index as an outcome is given by
tr Mi:
We also discus generalized feasible time evolution.
Denition 12 Let L(H) be the set of all linear operators on a Hilbert space
H. A linear map  : L(H1)! L(H2) is called a trace-preserving completely-
positive (TPCP) map if the following conditions hold:
1. trT = tr(T ); 8T 2 L(H1);
2.  
 n : L(H1) 
 L(Cn) ! L(H2) 
 L(Cn) is a linear positive map 8
for any n 2 N.
Remark that L(H) is a (dimH)2 dimensional Hilbert space with respect
to some inner product 9 for linear operators on H. Any generalized time
evolution is described by some TPCP map. Inversely, we postulate that any
TPCP map denotes some time evolution. In particular, we call an operation,
e.g., time evolution, described by a TPCP map a quantum operation. We
introduce useful representation of TPCP maps.
6Partial trace is sometimes called a reduced density operator.
7We omit proofs of the facts. For more details, see Ref.[27, 28, 29].
8
 n(A)  0 holds for any positive operator A.
9For instance, dene an inner product called the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product
hT jSiHS := trT y S for T; S 2 L(H). Then, L(H) is a Hilbert space with it.
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Theorem 13 (Kraus representation [37], Stinespring representation [38]).
The following conditions are equivalent:
1.  : L(H1)! L(H2) is a TPCP map,
2. There exist linear maps Vi : H1 ! H2(i = 1; 2; : : : ; l) such thatPl
i=1 Vi
y Vi = I and
(T ) =
lX
i=1
ViTVi
y; (3.2)
hold for any T 2 L(H1).
3. Let H3 = H2. There exist a pure state 0 2 S(H2
H3) and a unitary
operator U on H1
H2
H3 such that
() = tr1;3 U(
 0)U y; (3.3)
holds for any  2 S(H1).
Then, eq.(3.2) is called Kraus representation of a TPCP map  and each
Vi is called a Kraus operator. Eq.(3.3) is called Stinespring representation
of the map. By observing eq.(3.3), it is possible to realize any TPCP map
using relevant a pure state and a unitary operator.
Figure 3.5: Realization of general time evolution
POVM measurements are most generalized measurements, but those
measurements do not describe measurement processes. We introduce useful
tool to describe probability and measurement process simultaneously.
Denition 14 An n-tupple of linear operators Vi : H1 ! H2(i =
1; 2; : : : ; n) is called an n-tupple of measurement operators if
P
i Vi
y Vi = I
holds.
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We can describe any measurement and its measurement process by using
corresponding measurement operators. Suppose that we measure a quantum
system in a quantum state  with a measurement described by measurement
operators (Vi)
n
i=1. Then, probability of obtaining an index i as an outcome
is given by
trVi
y Vi;
and after measurement state is described by
ViVi
y
trVi y Vi
:
For instance, (
p
Mi)i
10 are measurement operators for any POVM (Mi)i.
The POVM measurement is described by the measurement operators, then
corresponding probability is given by tr
p
Mi
ypMi = trMi, and typical
measurement process 11 is described by
p
Mi
p
Mi= trMi.
3.3 Entanglement
Quantum information theory enables us to overcome the limitations of the
conventional computation and communication. To understand the reason
why it is possible, it is helpful to investigate the dierent points between
quantum physics and non quantum physics. The notion of entanglement
shows one of the most drastic dierences. Entanglement often plays crucial
roles in quantum information theory.
Let A and B be two quantum systems described by Hilbert spaces HA
and HB, respectively. Their bipartite quantum system is described by a ten-
sor product Hilbert spaceHA
HB. A quantum state described by a density
operator  2 HA
HB is called a separable state if it can be decomposed
into the following form:
 =
X
i
pi
A
i 
 Bi ;
where (pi)i is nonnegative values with
P
i pi = 1 and (
A
i )i; (
B
i )i are quan-
tum states of HA;HB, respectively.
A quantum state of the bipartite quantum system is called an entan-
gled state (of the bipartite quantum system) if the quantum state is not a
10Remind that an operator T is an Hermitian if T is a positive operator. An Hermitian
T takes spectral decomposition: T =
P
i iPi, where i is positive real number for any i,
then, dene f(T ) :=
P
i f(i)Pi for a function f on R, e.g.,
p
T =
P
i
p
iPi.
11Remark that after measurement state is not uniquely determined for a POVM,
typically. For instance, (
p
Mi)i and (U
p
Mi)i are two measurement opera-
tors for any a POVM (Mi)i, where U(6= I) is an arbitrary unitary opera-
tor. Then, tr
p
Mi
ypMi = tr(U
p
Mi)
y U
p
Mi holds but
p
Mi
p
Mi= trMi 6=
U
p
Mi(U
p
Mi)
y = tr(U
p
Mi)
y U
p
Mi.
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separable state. Particularly, a pure state described by
1p
d
dX
i=1
jeii 
 jfii 2 HA
HB;
is called a maximally entangled state, where dimHA = dimHB = d and
fjeiigi; fjfiigi are ONBs of HA;HB, respectively.
Suppose that HA and HB are measured with same observable separately.
There exist several observables to obtain correlated outcomes on measuring
HA and HB separately if the quantum state of the bipartite quantum sys-
tem is an entangled state, e.g., an outcome 1 is obtained on measuring HA
if and only if an outcome 1 is obtained on measuring HB, an outcome  1
is obtained on measuring HA if and only if an outcome  1 is obtained on
measuring HB. Such correlation of the outcomes is called quantum correla-
tion. We discuss quantum correlation in 2-level quantum system in the next
section, mentioning the particular example.
Now it seems natural to investigate a criterion that enables us to tell
whether a given state is entangled or separable. This is the problem of
separability criterion. Unfortunately, only for the very small quantum sys-
tems, the necessary and sucient criterion is known. For instance, so-called
Peres-Horodecki criterion [39, 40] works only for 2 2 or 2 3 dimensional
bipartite quantum systems. Recently Hofmann and Takeuchi [41] proposed
an interesting criterion using the uncertainty relation. Their original crite-
rion was based on the Robertson-type uncertainty relation [42]. Moreover,
several works [43, 44, 45] following it showed the possibility of using other
kinds of the uncertainty relations. In particular, Vicente and Sanchez-Ruiz
[45] proposed a criterion based on the Landau-Pollak uncertainty relation
and examined its eectiveness in the 22 bipartite systems. Although their
criterion is simple and works well in the low-dimensional case, they have
not succeeded in obtaining a criterion that is eective in the higher dimen-
sional systems. After their work, Miyadera and Imai [46] proposed a possible
generalization of it to the higher dimensional systems by using their gener-
alized Landau-Pollak uncertainty relation. We showed further investigation
and improvement on this direction [47]. We obtained a strict Landau-Pollak
type inequality for observables related with mutually unbiased bases [48, 49]
in prime dimensional Hilbert spaces.
Foundation theory of entanglement such as the above discussion has been
studied in many previous works. On the other hand, its applied technologies
are also studies by many researchers and engineers. Especially, entanglement
plays crucial roles in quantum communication. Quantum superdense coding
[50, 51] is a technique to enable us to send 2n bits by using only n quantum
systems. In the coding scheme, rstly, a sender and a receiver share a
entanglement constructed from two quantum systems. The sender encode
the quantum state to a quantum code according to chosen two bits and
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sends the system to the receiver. The receiver measures the bipartite system
with a relevant measurement and obtains an outcome expressing the two
bits. Quantum teleportation [3, 52] is a scheme to enable us to teleport any
quantum state by using only classical information. In the scheme, the sender
and the receiver also share a bipartite system in a maximally entangled
state. The sender measures a bipartite system constructed from one of
the prepared bipartite system and a quantum system in a state teleported
to the sender. After the measurement, the sender sends the outcome to
the receiver. The receiver performs a relevant time evolution according to
the outcome on one of the prepared bipartite system and obtain the state
prepared by the sender. In both of two techniques, it is necessary that
the sender and the receiver share pairs of entanglement in advance over a
noisy quantum channel and a public channel. To attain this goal one may
employ so called entanglement distillation protocols (purication protocols,
or sharing protocols) [53, 54, 55, 56, 57]. Those protocols are closely related
to quantum error-correcting codes.
3.4 Quantum Bit
In this section, we introduce quantum bit systems which play basic role
in quantum information processing such as quantum cryptography, quan-
tum computation, and so on. We call a quantum system described by 2
dimensional Hilbert space a quantum bit system (qubit system) and call a
quantum state of a qubit system a qubit state. Any qubit state of a qubit
H ' C2 has the following form:
j0i+ j1i;
where ;  2 C with jj2 + jj2 = 1 and
j0i := (1; 0)>; j1i := (0; 1)> 2 C2 :
In quantum computation, a bit string is corresponded to a qubits state of
qubits (composite quantum bits). For s = (s1; s2;    ; sn) 2 Fn2 12 , we dene
a corresponding pure state by jsi := js1i 
 js2i 
    
 jsni 2 H
n, where
H
n := H
H
   
H (n times tensor product Hilbert space). Then, any
qubit state of H
n is uniquely represented as Ps2Fn2 sjsi 2 H
n, where
s 2 C satisfying
P
s jsj2 = 1.
We introduce basic observables on qubit so called Pauli matrices:
x :=

0 1
1 0

; y :=

0  i
i 0

; z :=

1 0
0  1

:
12Dene Fn2 := f(a1; a2; : : : ; an) j ai 2 F2g.
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The Pauli matrices are decomposed into the following form:
x = +1j+ih+j   1j ih j;
y = +1j+0ih+0j   1j 0ih 0j;
z = +1j0ih0j   1j1ih1j;
where
j+i := 1=
p
2(1; 1)>; j i := 1=
p
2(1; 1)>;
j+0i := 1=
p
2(1; i)>; j 0i := 1=
p
2(1; i)>:
Suppose that we measure a qubit in a state jxi with an observable J(J 2
fx; y; zg). We obtain an eigenvalue i 2 f1; 1g of J as an outcome with
probability 1 if jxi is an eigenvector of the eigenvalue i of J . On the
other hand, probability of obtaining an outcome i is equal to 0 if jxi is
an eigenvector of the eigenvalue i0( 6= i) of J . For any J , probability of
obtaining an eigenvalue i of J is equal to 1=2 if jxi is an eigenvector of
J 0(J
0 6= J).
Considering the Pauli matrices, those are not only Hermitian matrices
but also unitary matrices. We often use the notations X = x; Y = y,
Z = z as time evolutions. Note that X(j0i + j1i) = j1i + j0i and
Z(j0i + j1i) = j0i   j1i hold. The Pauli matrix X is called Pauli X
gate and the matrix Z is called Pauli X gate 13 , and Y = iXZ holds.
We can ip one bit (j0i $ j1i) by using Pauli X gate and can ip phase
(j1i $  j1i) by using Pauli Z gate.
We dene the following qubits state:
j	+i := 1p
2
(j0i 
 j0i+ j1i 
 j1i);
j	 i := 1p
2
(j0i 
 j0i   j1i 
 j1i);
j+i := 1p
2
(j0i 
 j1i+ j1i 
 j0i);
j i := 1p
2
(j0i 
 j1i   j1i 
 j0i):
The qubits states are called Bell states. Those are most useful entangled
states in quantum information processing such as quantum cryptography,
quantum teleportation, and quantum communication. Suppose that we
measure two qubits in the Bell state j	+i separately with a projective mea-
surement corresponding to the observable z. According to the axiom, we
13In quantum error-correcting codes, X is called bit-ip error and Z is called phase-ip
error.
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obtain an outcome i 2 f1; 1g from one qubit if an outcome from the other
is equal to i. In this case, the outcomes are correlated. By the way,
1p
2
(j0i 
 j0i+ j1i 
 j1i) = 1p
2
(j+i 
 j+i+ j i 
 j i);
holds. From the construction above, outcomes with measurements of x
instead of z are also correlated. In this way, we obtain correlated outcomes
with measurement of several observables. The strongly correlation is called
quantum correlation.
Chapter 4
Basics of Quantum
Error-Correcting Codes
4.1 Modern Coding Theory
Modern coding theory 1 is closely related to Information theory. Shannon in-
troduced channel coding theorem in 1948 [16]. To put it simply, the theorem
showed that there exists a code such that error rate of the code converges
zero for any coding rate which is less than or equal to channel capacity.
Showing existence of such a code is an interesting point of this theorem.
Therefore, coding theory was became brisk for constructing such a code.
We introduce a simple example of error-correcting codes. Let us con-
sider that the noisy communication channel is an independent, identically
distributed channel, i.e., each bit of the bit string is ipped with a priori
probability p. Suppose that a sender sends bit 1 (length of the bit string 0)
to a receiver on the channel. The receiver could determine the sent bit as 0
if the bit 1 is ipped. In this manner, they cannot communicate correctly.
We add redundancy bit to sent bit string to settle the problem. The code
is called a repetition code. For example, we add redundancy two bit to one
bit such as
0 2 F2 7! (000) 2 F32; 1 2 F2 7! (111) 2 F32 :
Decision by a majority is a kind of very simple error-correcting methods.
Suppose that the sent bit string 000 is changed to 001. Then, the number
of symbol 0 is greater than the number of symbol 1. Therefore, the receiver
guess the sent bit string as 000 according to majority decision. However,
majority decision is not omnipotent error-correcting method. In fact, the
receiver guess the sent bit string as 111 if that the sent bit string 000 is
changed to 011.
1For more details, see Ref.[58, 59]
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In general, we call a map Enc : Fk2 ! C  Fn2 (k  n) an encoder. The
domain and the range of Enc are called a source and a code, respectively.
A element of a code is called a code word. We call a map Dec : Fn2 ! Fk2 a
decoder. In particular, a k dimensional subspace of an n dimensional vector
space Fn2 on F2 is called an [n; k] linear code. In modern coding theory, we
try to construct three tuple of a linear code, an encoder, and a decoder such
that decoding error rate of the code is extremely small and the encoder and
the decoder is operated in realistic time for nite and appropriate number n.
That is, we try to construct optimal a code and a decoder satisfying channel
codding theorem.
Let C be an [n; k] linear code, i.e., C is a k dimensional subspace of Fn2 .
We dene the dual code of C as orthogonal complement of C. We describe
C? as the dual code. Let feign ki=1 be a base of C?. We dene a parity
check matrix HC = (hij)
n k;n
i=1;j=1 of C as hij is equal to jth element of ei
for any i and j. We notice that HC  c> so called a syndrome is equal to
the zero vector of Fn2 for any c 2 C since any row of HC is orthogonal to
any codeword of C. If a syndrome for a received element c0 of Fn2 is equal
to the zero, c0 is the sent code word. We notice that the sent code word
is changed into a non code word if the syndrome is not equal to the zero
vector. Therefore, we estimate bit ip eecting the sent code word by using
the syndrome and try to correct the non code word with the estimation.
Figure 4.1: Model of error-correcting codes
4.2 General Quantum Error-Correcting Codes
We introduce an abstract of general quantum codes. In modern coding
theory, we focus attention on bit ip error for bit strings. On the other hand,
in quantum coding theory , we need to take account of many kinds of error
since quantum systems are aected with any time evolution represented by
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unitary operators or TPCP maps, e.g., a qubit state is changed to another
qubit state such like j0i + j1i 7! 0j0i + 0j1i, where ; ; 0; 0 2 C
with jj2 + jj2 = 1 and j0j2 + j0j2 = 1. We introduced a model of a
quantum communication over a noisy quantum channel. Let us consider
that information source is a set of quantum systems and a quantum system
in information source is encoded to a quantum system so called a code state
in a quantum code 2. A sender prepares a quantum system in a code state
and sends it to a receiver over a noisy quantum channel described by a
TPCP map. The receiver tries to corrects disturbance of the sent code state
and decodes the system to the system in information source.
Figure 4.2: Model of quantum error-correcting codes
We dene quantum error operators and quantum error-correcting codes
formally. Suppose that a quantum system H in a quantum state described
by a density operator  is prepared and is sent over a noisy quantum channel.
The state could be disturbed collapse by noise on the channel. The process is
described by a Kraus representation of a TPCP map. A family of operators
on H L which is a complex vector space is called the error. By using a
subset fLigi  L satisfying X
i
LyiLi = I;
a quantum operation of disturbing the quantum stat  is represented by
 7!
X
i
LiL
y
i :
Note that each Li is called an error operator.
Throughout this paper, we deal with quantum codes constructed from
quantum systems in pure states.
2We can also consider that information source is a set of bit strings and a bit string of
it is encoded to a quantum system in a code state.
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Denition 15 Let H be a d dimensional Hilbert space. An n dimensional
subspace C  H is called a [d; n] quantum code. A pure state of the quantum
code C is called a code state.
A quantum error-correcting code against error operators is, in a word, a pair
of a quantum code and operators to correct the error.
Denition 16 (Knill-Laamme [60]). Let C  H be a [d; n] quantum code,
L = f~Ligi error on H. C is called a quantum error-correcting code against
L if there exists a set of operators on H R = fRjgj satisfying
max
j i2C
X
i;j
k(Rj ~Li   h jRj ~Lij i)j ik2 = 0;
and
P
j R
y
jRj = I Then, R is called recovery operators against L.
Knill and Laamme also introduce necessary and sucient condition for a
pair of a quantum code and operators being a quantum error correcting code
against given error operators. The condition is derived from the viewpoint
of operator algebra.
Theorem 17 (Knill-Laamme [60]). Let C be a [d; n] quantum code and
L error on H. There exists a set of recovery operators R = fRjgj withP
j R
y
jRj = I such that C is a quantum error-correcting code against L if
and only if
E ~Lyi ~Li0E = ii0E;
holds for any ~Li; ~Li0 2 L, where E is the projection operator onto C and
ii0 2 C.
Figure 4.3: Orthogonality between a pair of code states
Lastly, we introduce examples of constructions of general quantum
codes against several error. The codes are called stabilizer codes [61] and
Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [62, 63]. It is known that CSS codes
are a class of stabilizer codes. We call a group
fa1A1 
 a2A2 
    
 anAn j ai 2 C; Ai 2 fX;Y; Z; Igg;
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with multiple of matrices Pauli group. An abelian subgroup of Pauli group is
called a stabilizer group. Let S be a stabilizer group. We dene a stabilizer
code by
CS := spanfj i 2 (C2)
n j sj i = j i; 8s 2 Sg;
where any j i is normalized. For example, a subgroup generated by fZ
Z

I; I
Z 
 Zg is a stabilizer group. Then, a stabilizer code for the stabilizer
group is fj000i+ j111i j ;  2 Cg.
CSS codes are a class of stabilizer codes and a CSS code is constructed
from a pair of linear codes. Recall that a linear code is called an [n; k] code
if the code is a k dimensional vector space of a n dimensional vector space
Fn2 over F2. Let C and D be [n; k] linear codes over F2 satisfying D?  C,
where D? be the dual code of D under the standard inner product, i.e., D?
is the orthogonal complement of D. A CSS code is dened as a subspace
spanned by the collection of the following statesX
d2D?
jd ci 2 (C2)
n;
where c 2 C and  denotes bit wise exclusive OR. A twisted relation D? 
C holds if and only if
HCH
>
D = 0;
where HC (resp. HD) is an arbitrary parity-check matrix of C (resp. D)
and 0 is a zero matrix. Performance of error correction of CSS codes depend
on performance of error correction of linear codes from which the CSS codes
are constructed.
Figure 4.4: Classes of error-correcting codes
Chapter 5
Basics of Quantum
Cryptography
5.1 Modern Cryptography
Cryptography is used for achieving untroubled information society 1 . For
instance, internet shopping via communication channels between buyers and
sellers is protected leaking of secret information to an outsider by using sev-
eral cryptographic techniques. We call current cryptography modern cryp-
tography. In the above instance, the buyer sends secret information such as
personal information, credit card number, and so on, to the seller. Gener-
ally, the sender encrypts the secret information so called a plain text to a
cipher text by using encryption key and sends the cipher text to the receiver
over the public channel. The receiver decodes the cipher text to the plain
text by using a decoding key. Let us consider that an eavesdropper obtains
the cipher text on the channel. Then, the eavesdropper cannot gain secret
information from the text easily since the cipher text cannot be decoded
easily without using the decoding key. We often call the sender, the re-
ceiver, and the eavesdropper Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. The modern
cryptography is often classied as public key cryptography and symmetric
key cryptography.
 Public key cryptography:
In public key cryptography, Bob generates a pair of a public key as a
encryption key and a secret key as a decoding key rstly. He publishes
the public key and keeps the secret key in secret. Alice encrypts a plain
text to a cipher text by using the public key published by Bob. Bob
receives the cipher text from Alice and decodes the text to the plain
text by using the secret key kept by himself. In public key cryptogra-
phy, every body obtaining the public key can encode a plain text by
1For more details, see Ref.[64]. Ref.[65] gives a detailed description of history of cryp-
tography.
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using the encoder. However, none but Bob having the secret key can
decode by using the decoder. Digital signatures and authentication
systems are constructed as applications of public key cryptography.
The idea of public key cryptography is introduced by Die and Hell-
man [66] in 1976. Years later, RSA cryptosystem [67] and ElGamal
cryptosystem [68] as representative public key cryptography are intro-
duced. Those cryptosystems are constructed from several algorithms
to applied properties of algebra.
 Symmetric key cryptography:
In symmetric key cryptography, encryption key is equal to decoding
key exactly and the keys as the secret key are prevented the leakage
to a person other than Alice and Bob. Therefore, Alice and Bob share
the secret key before using cryptography. This problem is called a key
sharing problem. Now, we assume that they share the secret key in se-
cret. Alice encrypts a plain text to a cipher text by using the secret key
and sends it to Bob. He decodes it to the plain text by using the secret
key. Lightweight computational cost is a peculiarity of symmetric key
cryptography, although it is necessary to settle the key sharing prob-
lem. Most famous symmetric cryptosystem Deta Encryption Standard
(DES) [69] is selected as Federal Information Processing Standard in
1977. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [70] is also selected as
new standard cryptosystem in USA. MISTY [71] and FEAL [72] are
developed in Japan.
We introduced the classication of modern cryptography from a view-
point of its functions and constructions. In this section, we classify modern
cryptography from a viewpoint of its security criteria.
 Computational security:
We explain security of cryptosystem as an example of computation
security. RSA cryptosystem is a kind of public key cryptography.
Thus, a public key is published in public. On the other hand, a secret
key is kept in secret. Consider that Eve gains the public key and
calculates the secret key from the public key. In RSA cryptosystem,
factorization of composite number included in the public key is one
of methods of calculating the secret key from the public key. Key
size of the public key which is now widely used is more than 1024
bits. The factorization of composite number included in such a large
size public key is very hard in realistic time. Security guaranteed
with hardness of computation is called computational security. It is
not argued that cryptosystems with computational security cannot
guarantee security without any condition. In the above example, Eve
can gain the secret key with factorizing the public key if she can take
unlimited computational time. Moreover, Shor proposed a quantum
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algorithm [2], so called Shor's algorithm, to enable us to factorize large
size number realistically by using a quantum computer. Therefore,
cryptography which guarantees computational security is not secure in
a long run if computers or algorithms can be improved dramatically.
 Unconditional security:
We explain security of one-time pad which is a kind of symmetric key
cryptography as an example of unconditional security. In one-time
pad, calculations is very simple. For a plain text m 2 Fn2 and a secret
key k 2 Fn2 , a cipher text c has the following form: c = m  k 2 Fn2 ,
where  denotes an operation of the bitwise exclusive OR. On the
other hand, decoding of the cipher text is denoted by m = c k. Let
M be a random variable relevant to plain texts, K a random variable
relevant to secret keys, and C a random variable to cipher texts. Let
M;K and C be random variables expressing plain texts, secret keys,
and cipher texts, respectively. Then,
H(M) = H(M j C); (5.1)
H(M j C;K) = 0; (5.2)
hold. Eq.(5.1) denotes that uncertainty of the plain text is not reduced
even if we have the cipher text, i.e., Eve cannot gain information of
the plain texts if she can gain the cipher texts on the communication
channel and has unlimited computational power and time. On the
other hand, eq.(5.2) denotes that we can decodes the cipher text to
the plain text if we have the secret key, i.e., the legitimate users can
decode by using the secret key. In this manner, one-time pad guar-
antees security by lack of information to decode the cipher text. We
call this type of security unconditional security. Cryptography with
unconditional security guarantees security for a long time since the se-
curity has nothing to do with computational power or time. However,
length of the secret key should be grater than length of the plain text
and we use the secret key once and then throw it away. In addition,
we should resolve the key sharing problem if we use one-time pad in
practical.
5.2 Quantum Cryptography
5.2.1 Abstract of Quantum Cryptography
As mentioned above, cryptography with computational security cannot
guarantee longterm security if computational algorithms, computer, and so
on are made remarkable progress. Therefore, we expect that cryptography
with unconditional security is made progress. One-time pad is a kind of
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Figure 5.1: One-time pad cryptosystem
symmetric key cryptography with unconditional security. The encryption
and the decryption algorithm of one-time pad take at a low computational
cost. However, key sharing is a nasty problem. Quantum key distribution
protocol (QKD protocol) is a solution for the problem and it is expected
to guarantee \unconditional security". In typical QKD protocol, Alice pre-
pares a qubit in a qubit state to which is encoded bit as a key and sends
the qubit to Bob over a quantum channel. Bob measures it with an ob-
servable and obtains an outcome as a key. After Alice and Bob operate the
above process a large number of times or repetitions, they try to detect an
eavesdropper Eve with half of the keys. If they dose not detect Eve, secret
key is generated by operating error-correction and privacy amplication on
remaining the keys. Quantum cryptography is dened as a combination of
one-time pad and QKD protocols.
Figure 5.2: A combination of a quantum key distribution protocol and one-
time pad
In 1984, Bennet and Brassard proposed original QKD protocol with
noncommutative observable x and z. It is so called BB84 protocol [1].
In BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob try to share secret key by using two pairs
of orthogonal qubit states realized by four kinds of polarizations of photon
2 and two measurements corresponding to noncommutative observables. A
2In practical, phase dierence between photons is used for encoding bit instead of
polarization of photon. QKD protocol using phase dierence of photons for encoding is
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generalization of BB84 protocol is discussed, i.e., y in addition to x and z
are employed by Alice and Bob, and three pairs of orthogonal qubit states
are used for encoding. The general protocol is called six-state quantum key
distribution protocol [74]. On the other hand, a QKD protocol which is
more simpler than BB84 protocol was introduced. This QKD protocol is
called B92 protocol [75]. In B92 protocol, random bit is encoded to one of
two nonorthogonal qubit states. In 1991, Ekert proposed a QKD protocol
by using the Bell state [76]. The QKD protocol is called E91 protocol. In
the protocol, Alice prepares two qubits in the Bell state and sends one of the
qubits to Bob. After that they perform one of measurements corresponding
x and z randomly and separately on the each qubit. Same outcome as a
key is shared if they choose same observable. Then, it is known that security
notion of BB84 is equivalent to it of E91.
Several cryptographic techniques other than QKD protocols are intro-
duced in the related works. Okamoto et al., introduced so called OTU
cryptosystem [77] and Kawachi et al., introduced so called KKNY cryp-
tosystem [78] in 2000 and 2005 respectively. Those cryptosystem are a kind
of quantum public key cryptography. A quantum digital signature scheme
was introduced by Gottesman and Chuang in 2001 [79]. The scheme is called
GC signature scheme. Hillery et al., introduced a quantum secret sharing
scheme so called HBB protocol in 1999 [80].
5.2.2 An Example: BB84 Protocol
We introduce BB84 protocol as an example of QKD protocols. BB84 pro-
tocol is constructed from the following steps:
1. Alice prepares a bit generated by random bit and sends qubit in a
quantum state of her selecting to Bob over quantum channel. If a
generated bit is equal to 0, j0i or j+i are selected randomly. If a
generated bit is equal to 1, j1i or j i are selected randomly. Alice also
keeps Z (resp. X) if j0i or j1i (resp. j+i or j i) is selected.
2. Bob receives the qubit and carries out a measurement with respect
to observable Z(= z) or X(= x) randomly on the qubit. Then,
he keeps a measurement outcome and selected observable. He also
obtains a bit from the outcome, i.e., bitwise transpose: 1 7! 0 and
 1 7! 1.
3. They repeat the above steps large times sucient to generate a bit
string with large length.
4. Alice publishes which of the X or Z she has selected to Bob over a
public channel. They check the bit string and discard a bit if the bit is
generated by X (resp. Z) and the observable Z (resp. X) is selected.
called a dierential phase shift-quantum key distribution [73].
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5. They calculate error rate of bits randomly chosen from the checked
bits. They abort the protocol if the rate is grater than or equal to
a preset rate. Otherwise, they perform error correction and privacy
amplication on the left over bits to generate nal secret key.
Figure 5.3: BB84 protocol
Table 5.1: The relationship between Alice's bit and Bob's bit
X Z
0 1 0 1
j+i j i j0i j1i
X = x 0 1 0 or 1 0 or 1
Z = z 0 or 1 0 or 1 1 0
Table 5.1 denotes the relationship between Alice's bit preparation and
bit obtained by Bob. Remark that calculation of the error rate in Step 5
plays a role of a function of detecting eavesdropping, i.e., Alice and Bob
determine that Eve obtain large information if the rate is sucient large.
We can share same bit string with error correction and leakage information
dose not make sense with privacy amplication [81].
Figure 5.4: Error correction and privacy amplication
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5.2.3 Consideration on Security for BB84 Protocol
It is expected that BB84 protocol guarantees \unconditional security". Un-
fortunately, there are several denition of unconditional security in according
to settings of equipments, channel, and so on. Suppose that equipments and
channels employed by the user are ideally perfect, i.e., Alice can prepare the
desired qubit, Bob can detect qubit and measure it without false detection
and loss of performance of key generating, and noise derived from environ-
ment dose not occur on the quantum and public channels. Suppose that an
attacker Eve with unconditional computational and physically power eaves-
drops on both of the quantum and public channels in this setting. Then,
unconditional security means that Eve cannot gain any information with-
out being detected by the user. In this sense, leakage information is zero
by using BB84 protocol. Mayers introduced rst proof of unconditionally
security for BB84 protocol in 1996 [82]. Then, Shor and Preskill proved it
by using CSS codes in 2000 [53].
In 2000 [83], Biham et al. introduced a proof by using information dis-
turbance theorem [83, 84]. We summarize the proof introduced by Biham
et al. intuitively. Information disturbance theorem means that there is
no quantum operation to gain information from a quantum system with-
out disturbing the state. To applying the theorem to the setting of BB84
protocol, it is shown that Eve cannot gain information without disturbing
the qubit states. Then, error rate of secret key shared by Alice and Bob is
not equal to zero since Bob cannot obtain the desired outcomes from the
disturbed state. Therefore, Eve is detected by gaining the information with
any quantum operation.
Figure 5.5: Inevitable disturbance of quantum states by eavesdropping
We can immediately see the fact against Eve's simple attack. Suppose
that Eve try to obtain secret key by performing randomly chosen X or Z
projective measurement on each qubit on the quantum channel from Alice
to Bob and sends the post measurement state to Bob. This attack is called
intercept-resend attack. Eve dose not disturb the eigenstates of Z (resp. X)
if Eve measures it with Z (resp. X). However, the eigenstates of Z (resp. X)
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prepared by Alice is disturbed if Eve measures it with X (resp. Z), i.e., the
eigenstate of Z is change to one of two eigenstates of X with probability 1=2.
Considering disagreement of bit string, probability that Alice and Bob share
same bit in any element of the bit string is equal to 3=4. This probability
seems large value in oder to detecting Eve with error probability. However,
we can make the probability of small value by choosing large number of
pairs of bits. For instance, the probability is equal to (3=4)n for n pairs
of bits, then, probability of occurring of disagreement for n pairs of bits is
equal to 1   (3=4)n. Therefore, the lager number of checked bits, the lager
probability of detecting Eve with error rate of bits.
Chapter 6
Mean King's Problem and
Its Application
6.1 Mean King's Problem
Mean King's problem is formulated by Vaidman, Aharonov, and Albert [5].
The problem is told as a tale that mean King gives physicist Alice a retro-
diction problem [85, 86, 87]. King asks Alice to prepare a qubit system in
an arbitrary state. Then, King measures the system with one of observables
x; y; and z and obtains an outcome 1 or  1. After this measurement,
King gives back Alice the system. Alice measures the post measurement
system with an arbitrary measurement. After that King reveals the ob-
servable which he employed, then, Alice has to guess the outcome obtained
by King immediately by using the outcome obtained by her and knowledge
of the observable. The problem is to nd the measurement employed by
and the initial state prepared by Alice such that she guesses the outcome
obtained by King perfectly. In Ref.[5], a solution to the problem is shown
using the Bell state. Alice prepares the qubit system given to King and an
ancillary qubit system kept by her in the Bell state, then Alice guesses the
King's outcome perfectly by using a measurement derived from Aharonov-
Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule [88] on the bipartite qubits system.
Let HA ' C2 be a qubit kept by Alice and HK ' C2 a qubit given
by Alice to King. The bipartite system HA
HK is prepared in the Bell
state j	+i = 1=p2(j0i 
 j0i+ j1i 
 j1i). Alice gives only HK to King, who
measures it with one of the observables:
x = +1j+ih+j   1j ih j;
y = +1j+0ih+0j   1j 0ih 0j;
z = +1j0ih0j   1j1ih1j:
Recall that j0i = (1; 0)>; j1i = (0; 1)>; j+i = 1=p2(1; 1)>; j i :=
1=
p
2(1; 1)>; j+0i := 1=p2(1; i)>; and j 0i := 1=p2(1; i)>. King obtains
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Figure 6.1: Mean King's problem
an outcome i 2 f1; 1g. The measurement changes the state according
to the projective (Luders) postulate. For instance, if King chooses x and
obtains i, then, the initial King's state  = trA j	+ih	+j is transformed
into,
XiXi
tr(XiXi)
;
where X1 = j+ih+j and X 1 = j ih j. After King measures the system, it
is returned to Alice. Alice measures the bipartite system with a PVM 1
R^ := (Rj := jrjihrj j)3j=0;
on HA
HK dened as
jr0i := 1p
2
j0ij0i+ 1
2
(j0ij1iei=4 + j1ij0ie i=4);
jr1i := 1p
2
j0ij0i   1
2
(j0ij1iei=4 + j1ij0ie i=4);
jr2i := 1p
2
j1ij1i+ 1
2
(j0ij1ie i=4 + j1ij0iei=4);
jr3i := 1p
2
j1ij1i   1
2
(j0ij1ie i=4 + j1ij0iei=4):
and obtains an index of the operator as an outcome j 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g. The
relationship between Alice's outcome and King's outcome is denoted in Table
6.1. Using this correspondence, Alice can estimate King's outcome perfectly
with her outcome and the knowledge of observable revealed by King. For
instance, King employs z and Alice obtains an outcome 2, then the outcome
obtained by King is equal to  1.
According to the ABL rule, a probability of obtaining an outcome i 2
f1; 1g with an observable J(J 2 fx; y; zg) between King's measurement
1Recall that an n-tuple of operators (Pi)
n
i=1 is called a projection-valued measure
(PVM) if
Pn
i=1 Pi = I and P
2
i = P
y
i = Pi hold for any i.
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Table 6.1: The relationship between King's observables and R^
0 1 2 3
x 1 -1 1 -1
y 1 -1 -1 1
z 1 1 -1 -1
and Alice's measurement is described by
p(J = i j Rj ; j	+i) = jhrj j I
PJ=ij	
+ij2P
i jhrj j I
PJ=ij	+ij2
;
where PJ=i denotes the projection into the eigenspace of the eigenvalue i
of J . For J; i, and j, Alice estimate King's outcome with probability 1 if
and only if
p(J = i j Rj ; j	+i) = 1;
holds.
6.2 Quantum Key Distribution Using Mean
King's Problem
In 2001, Bub [6] proposed a quantum key distribution protocol using
Mean King's problem. In the protocol, Alice prepares a bipartite system
HA
HK ' C2 
 C2 in the Bell state. She gives the system HK to King
and keeps the system HA with her. King measures the system HK with one
of observables 2,
X^ := (X0 := j0ih0j; X1 := j1ih1j);
Z^ := (Z0 := j0ih0j; Z1 := j1ih1j);
and returns the system to Alice 3. He keeps the outcome as a secret key.
Alice measures the bipartite system exactly with an observable R^ = fRj =
jrjihrj jg4j=1 on HA
HK dened in Sec.6.1 that solves Mean King's problem
for x(= X^); y(= Y^ ), and z(= Z^), and estimates King's outcome. If there
is no eavesdropper, Alice and King are able to share the key as R^ solves
Mean King's problem for x(= X^) and z(= Z^)
4. An eavesdropper called
Eve has opportunities to gain information of the secret key on a quantum
channel from Alice to King and it from King to Alice.
2Note that this notation is slightly dierent for indexes: x $ X^; z $ Z^ j0ih0j $
j+ih+j, and j1ih1j $ j ih j.
3In a similar way Y^ consists of projections derived from y.
4It has been shown in Sec.6.1.
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The quantum key distribution using Mean King's problem is described
as follows:
1. Alice prepares the bipartite system HA
HK in the Bell state j	+i.
She gives HK to King and keeps HA by herself.
2. King measures HK with an observable X^ or Z^ and obtains an outcome
0 or 1 as a sifted key 5. He returns the system to Alice.
3. Alice measures the bipartite system HA
HK with a PVM R^ and
obtains an outcome j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g.
4. King announces the observable (X^ or Z^) which he employed.
5. Alice estimates King's outcome with her outcome and knowledge of
King's observable.
6. They repeat the above steps 2n times to share 2n sifted keys and
calculate two kinds of error probabilities of sifted keys generated by
X^ and Z^ with randomly chosen n sifted keys.
7. If the error probabilities are greater than or equal to a preset ( 0),
they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they perform the leftover n sifted
keys to make nal keys with errorcorrection and privacy amplication.
Figure 6.2: Quantum key distribution using Mean King's problem
6.3 Historical Notes
Mean King's problem has been generalized concerning the prepared quan-
tum system and King's measurements [85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95].
5We construct a bit i 2 f0; 1g from an outcome i0 2 f1; 1g by using transpose 1 7! 0
and  1 7! 1.
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Table 6.2: The relationship between King's observables and R^
R1 R2 R3 R4
X^ 0 1 0 1
Z^ 0 0 1 1
In particular, it has been proved [89, 90, 91] that Alice can estimate King's
outcome by using a maximally entangled state in a setting that King mea-
sures one of the systems with one of projective measurements constructed
from mutually unbiased bases [48, 49]. On the other hand, Alice cannot
retrodict the outcome with certainty without using entangled states in the
setting [92, 93]. In the reference, an upper bound of the success probability
is also introduced. In case of King's measurements constructed from biased
bases, the problem is also investigated [94, 95].
In QKD protocol using Mean King's problem, Eve try to gain infor-
mation with measurement on the quantum channel from King to Alice and
sends the post measurement state to Alice, i.e., Eve employs an intercept re-
send attack on the quantum channel from King to Alice. Then, it was shown
that error probability, which means bit error rate of a secret key simply, is
greater than or equal to 3/8 for the intercept resend attack [6]. Werner et
al., [100] showed that Eve cannot gain information about secret key with-
out being detected even if Eve can attack qubits twice on the channels in
an arbitrary way. That is, they showed that the information gain by Eve
inevitably disturbs the outcomes obtained by the legitimate users. While
this result is important, in order to full security proof one has to derive a
quantitative trade-o relationship between the information gain by Eve and
the error probability of secret key obtained by Alice and Bob. Therefore, in
the next section, we drive such a trade-o for several attacks as a rst step
of obtaining full security proof of the protocol.
Chapter 7
A Solution Using Quantum
Error-Correcting Codes
7.1 General Mean King's Problem
We suppose that Alice can prepare an ancillary system in secret in addition
to the system given to King. Then, she answers the problem to King by
using correlation between the systems. Let d dimensional Hilbert space HK
be the system given to King and d0 dimensional Hilbert space HA the ancil-
lary system kept by Alice. King measures the system with one of projective
measurements in the conventional setting of Mean King's problem. In this
paper, we deal with more general setting with respect to the measurements.
King measures the system HK with one of the measurements described by
families of measurement operators M (J) = (M
(J)
i )i(J = 1; 2; : : : ;m) satisfy-
ing
P
iM
(J)
i
y
M
(J)
i = I. Suppose that the system in a state  is measured
with the measurement operators (M
(J)
i )i, then, recall that the probability of
obtaining ith outcome corresponding toM
(J)
i is given by pi = trM
(J)
i
y
M
(J)
i 
and the post measurement state is represented as
M
(J)
i M
(J)
i
y
pi
:
In this setting, the general Mean King's problem is described as the
follows:
1. Alice prepares the bipartite system HA 
HK in an initial state. She
gives the system HK to King and keeps the ancillary system HA.
2. King measures the system with one of the measurements described by
M (J) = (M
(J)
i )i (J = 1; 2; : : : ;m);
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then, King obtains ith outcome. The system is returned to Alice after
he measures it.
3. Alice measures the bipartite system HA 
 HK with a suitable Posi-
tive Operator Valued Measure (POVM) P = (Pj)j , i.e., Pj  0 andP
j Pj = I hold, and she obtains jth outcome.
4. King announces the measurement M
(J)
i which he employed.
5. Alice estimates the ith outcome obtained by King immediately by
using the jth outcome and the measurement M (J).
Figure 7.1: General Mean King's problem
With given d and measurements M (J) = (M
(J)
i )i, we say that a solu-
tion to Mean King's problem exists if and only if a pair of an initial state
and a measurement employed by Alice exist such that she estimates King's
outcome with probability 1.
7.2 A Solution to the Problem
In this section, we introduce a solution of the general Mean King's problem
by using the relationship between the problem and quantum error-correcting
codes. Note that the following theorem is a solution to Mean King's prob-
lem. In the next section, we prove existence of the solution in prime power
dimensional case.
Theorem 18 Let C  HA
HK be an n dimensional subspace (i.e., C is
a [dd0; n] quantum code) and E the projection operator onto C. If there
exists l-tuple of Kraus operators (Lk)
l
k=1 on HK with
P
k L
y
kLk = IK and
non-empty index sets X(J;i)  f1; 2; : : : ; lg satisfying
IA
M (J)i =
P
k2X(J;i) IA
Lk on C; (7.1)
X(J;i) \X(J;i0) = ;; 8J;8i 6= i0; (7.2)
E(IA
Lk)y(IA
Lk0)E = kk0kk0E; (7.3)
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for some kk0 2 C, then
(i) Alice can solve King's problem for any initial state in C,
(ii) C is a quantum error-correcting code against spanfIA
Lkglk=1.
Condition (7.1) denotes the relationship between the measurement op-
erators employed by King and the error operators. Condition (7.2) denotes
that a set of operators belong to ith outcome with the measurement is dis-
tinct from one belong to i0(6= i)th outcome with the same measurement.
Condition (7.3) is a sucient condition for distinguishing kinds of the error
operators perfectly.
Proof
(i) Let ji 2 C be an initial state prepared by Alice. If King chooses Jth
measurement and obtains ith outcome, then the post measurement state is
proportional to 1
IA 
M (J)i ji 2
M
k2X(J;i)
Kk;
where Kk := spanfIA 
 Lkj i j j i 2 Cg(k = 1; 2; : : : ; l). Note that Kk
is orthogonal to Kk0 for k 6= k0 from condition (7.3). Let Pk be the pro-
jection operator onto Kk, then P := (P1; P2; : : : ; Pl; P?) forms a (discrete)
projection valued measure (PVM), where P? := IA 
 IK  
Pl
k=1 Pk.
Let Alice performs the PVM measurement P and obtains kth outcome
(k = 1; 2; : : : l;?). With a revealed J and the outcome k, Alice is assured
that King's outcome i satised k 2 X(J;i). However, from condition (7.2),
such i is uniquely determined, and thus Alice can correctly guess the King's
outcome.
(ii) For any ~L =
Pl
k=1 k(IA
Lk); ~L =
Pl
k0=1 k0(IA
Lk0) 2
spanfIA 
 Lkglk=1,
E ~Ly ~LE =
 
lX
k;k0=1
kk0k
!
E;
holds, where k; k 2 C. By using the above equation and the Theorem 17, it
is shown that C is a quantum error-correcting code against spanfIA
Lkglk=1.

Figure 7.2: Decomposition of the bipartite system into orthogonal subspaces
Thus, it is a solution of Mean King's problem that Alice prepares a code
state of a quantum error-correcting code against errors into decomposed
1L denotes direct sum of several subspaces.
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the measurement operators and distinguishes a kind of the error operators
belong to the measurement perfectly. Note that the error operators (Kraus
operators) (Lk)
l
k=1 denotes not the measurement process performed by King
on S(HK). but the quantum operation as adding the error to the system.
7.3 Existence of Solutions in Prime-Power Dimen-
sions
In this section, we show existence of the our solution of Mean King's problem
owing to the previous works [89] in prime-power dimensions, i.e., we show
a construction of Kraus operators and index sets satisfying all conditions of
Theorem 18. We also show a concrete example of the solution by using the
above construction in the case of 2 dimensions.
We denote by L(H) the set of all linear operators on d dimensional
Hilbert space H. Note that L(H) is a d2 dimensional Hilbert space with
respect to the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product:
hAjBiHS := trAyB:
In the following, we consider the case where C  HA
HK is a one
dimensional subspace spanned by a maximal entangled state
j	i := 1p
d
dX
i=1
j ii 
 jii (7.4)
with orthonormal bases fj iigi and fjiigi of HA = HK = H. This includes
all conventional models of Mean King's problem.
Proposion 19 Let fLkgd2k=1 be an ortho\normal"base of L(H) with
hLkjLk0iHS = 1dkk0 . Then, fLkgd
2
k=1 satises
Pd2
k=1 L
y
kLk =
Pd2
k=1 LkL
y
k = I
and condition (7.3) irrespective of the choice of orthonormal bases fj iigi
and fjiigi.
Lemma 20 Let fLkgd2k=1 be an ortho\normal"base of L(H) with
hLkjLk0iHS = 1dkk0. Then,
d2X
k=1
LykLk =
d2X
k=1
LkL
y
k = I;
holds.
Proof
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Since hLkjLk0iHS = trLykLk0 = trLk0Lyk = hLyk0 jLykiHS , fLykgd
2
k=1 also
forms an ortho\normal"bases and A = d
Pd2
k=1 tr(LkA)L
y
k for any A 2 L(H).
With A = j ihj, we have j ihj = dPkhjLk iLyk and
hjij i = d
X
k
hjLk iLykji;
for any j i; ji 2 H. From this, we obtain
dX
j=1
hj jjij i =
dX
j=1
(d
d2X
k=1
hj jLk iLykjji):
The above equation holds if and only if,
j i = (
d2X
k=1
LykLk)j i;
holds for any j i. Thus Pk LykLk = I. By exchanging Lk and Lyk, we also
have
P
k LkL
y
k = I. 
Proof of Proposition 19
From Lemma 20, we only have to show condition (7.3) with arbitrary
orthonormal bases fj iigi and fjiigi. Notice that
h(IA
Lk)	j(IA
Lk0)	i = 1
d
dX
i=1
hij(LykLk0)ii
=
1
d
trLykLk0
=
1
d2
kk0 ;
holds for arbitrary fj iigi and fjiigi. Since C is a one dimensional subspace
spanned by j	i, condition (7.3) holds with k = 1=d2. 
We consider the following correspondence (which is similar to Choi-
Jamio lkowski isomorphisim [96, 97, 98]) between operators on H and vectors
of H
H:
L 2 L(H) 7! I
Lj	i 2 H
H : (7.5)
This gives an isomorphism between Hilbert spaces L(H) and H
H since
L = L0 if and only if I
Lj	i = I
L0j	i; (7.6)
8j i 2 H
H; 9!L 2 L(H) s:t: j i = I
Lj	i; (7.7)
8L;M 2 L(H); 1
d
hLjMiHS = h(I
L)	j(I
M)	i: (7.8)
Let C be the one dimensional subspace of H
H spanned by j	i:
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 Remark 1: From (7.6), condition (7.1) reduces to the operator-
equality: M
(J)
i =
P
k2X(J;i) Lk.
 Remark 2: From (7.8), condition (7.3) reduces to the orthogonality-
condition of fLkgk: hLkjLk0iHS = 1=dkk0 .
 Remark 3: Let fjiigd2i=1 be an orthonormal bases on H
H. Dene
operators fNigd2i=1 by jii = (I 
 dNi)j	i, then hNijNjiHS = 1=dij
holds.
Figure 7.3: An isomorphism between L(H) and S(H
H)
In the following, we prove the existences of Kraus operators fLkgk and
index set X(J;i) in Theorem 18 for the case of mutually unbiased bases
(MUBs). Let fjJ; iigdi=1 (J = 1; 2; : : : ; d+ 1) be complete sets of MUBs:
jhJ; ijJ 0; i0ij2 = JJ 0ii0 + 1
d
(1  JJ 0);
and let
M
(J)
i := jJ; iihJ; ij:
Let s(k; J) 2 f1; 2; : : : ; dg be a decision function of Alice so that Alice will
predict King's output to be s(k; J) if she gets outcome k and King's bases
is J . In Ref.[89], it was proved that there exists a decision function s(k; J)
and an orthonormal bases fjkigd2k=1 of H
H if and only if there exists the
maximal number d + 1 of orthogonal Latin squares: note that the latter
is known to exist when d is a power prime, but does not exist, e.g., for
d = 6; 10. In particular, s(k; J) and fjkigk satisfy
hJ;ijki = 1p
d
i;s(k;J); (7.9)
where
jJ;ii := jJ; ii 
 jJ; ii ( jJ; ii :=
X
j
hj jJ; iij ji):
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Indeed,
jki := 1p
d
d+1X
J=1
jJ;s(k;J)i   ji;
satises eq.(7.9).
(See eq.(7.9) in Ref.[89]: note that our notation is slightly dierent for in-
dexes: J $ A, i$ a, k $ I.)
Notice that
1p
d
jJ;ii = I
M (J)i j	i; (7.10)
holds. Now, we dene Kraus operators fLkgd2k=1 by
jki = (I
dLk)j	i; (7.11)
and an index set by
X(J;i) := fk 2 f1; : : : ; d2g j i = s(k; J)g: (7.12)
Then, from eq.(7.8), fLkgk forms an ortho\normal"bases of L(H):
hLkjLk0iHS = 1=dkk0 . From Proposition 19, we have
P
k L
y
kLk = I and
condition (7.3). From denition eq.(7.12), X(J;i) satises condition eq.(7.2).
Applying eq.(7.8) with eq.(7.10) and eq.(7.11), we have the following equa-
tion from eq.(7.9)
dhM (J)i jLkiHS = i;s(k;J):
Indeed,
hM (J)i jLkiHS = dh(I
M (J)i )	j(I
Lk)	i
= h(I
M (J)i )	j(I
dLk)	i
=
1p
d
hJ;ijki
=
1p
d
1p
d
i; s(k; J)
=
1
d
i; s(k; J);
holds. Thus, we obtain condition (7.1):
M
(J)
i = d
X
k
hLkjM (J)i iHSLk =
X
k
i; s(k; J)Lk =
X
k2X(J;i)
Lk:
Therefore, we have shown the existence of Kraus operators fLkgd2k=1 and
index set X(J;i) satisfying all the conditions in Theorem 18 provided that
there exists the maximal number d + 1 of orthogonal Latin squares. We
also reconsider the result given by Ref.[89] from a viewpoint of the quantum
error-correcting codes.
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7.4 An Example: A Solution in Two Dimensions
Suppose that Alice prepares qubit systems described byHA
HK ' C2
C2
in a Bell state j	+i = 1=p2(j0i 
 j0i + j1i 
 j1i), where j0i = (1; 0)> and
j1i = (0; 1)>. King chooses one of measurement operators constructed from
MUBs in 2 dimensional Hilbert space:
M (1) := (M
(1)
1 := j+ih+j;M (1)2 := j ih j);
M (2) := (M
(2)
1 := j+0ih+0j;M (2)2 := j 0ih 0j);
M (3) := (M
(3)
1 := j0ih0j;M (3)2 := j1ih1j);
where j+i = 1=p2(1; 1)>; j i = 1=p2(1; 1)>; j+0i = 1=p2(1; i)>; and
j 0i = 1=p2(1; i)>. Let us dene
L1 :=
1
4

0  1  i
 1 + i 2

;
L2 :=
1
4

2  1 + i
 1  i 0

;
L3 :=
1
4

0 1 + i
1  i 2

;
L4 :=
1
4

2 1  i
1 + i 0

;
by using eq.(7.11) and the measurement employed by Alice in Ref.[89]
generalized from Ref.[5]. As mentioned in the previous, we nd thatP4
k=1 L
y
kLk = IK and
M
(1)
1 = L3 + L4; M
(1)
2 = L1 + L2;
M
(2)
1 = L1 + L4; M
(2)
2 = L2 + L3;
M
(3)
1 = L2 + L4; M
(3)
2 = L1 + L3;
hold for the measurement operators performed by King and (Lk)
4
k=1. That
is, the operators (Lk)
4
k=1 and the index sets X
(J;i) (see Table 7.1) satisfy
conditions (7.1) and (7.2) of Theorem 18. For the Bell state j	+i,
h(IA 
 Lk)	+j(IA 
 Lk0)	+i = 1
4
kk0 ;
holds, i.e., condition (7.3) is satised by the above equation. Re-
mark that Alice's measurement L^, which consists of projections into
spanf(IA
Lk)j	+ig for any k, in the above setting is equal to the proposed
measurement R^ proposed in the original work.
Therefore, we can reconsider the solution in Ref.[5, 89] in the case of
qubit systems from the viewpoint of quantum error-correcting codes.
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Figure 7.4: Decomposition of qubit systems HA 
HK into ve orthogonal
subspaces
Table 7.1: The relationship between the measurement operators and index
sets in 2 dimensions
J i X(J;i) J i X(J;i)
1 1 3; 4 1 2 1; 2
2 1 1; 4 2 2 2; 3
3 1 2; 4 3 2 1; 3
7.5 Construction of Mean King's Problem with
Proposal
In this section, we introduce a setting of Mean King's problem which is solved
by using our proposal, then, measurement operators employed by King is
dened by any orthonormal bases and an initial state is a 1 dimensional
quantum code spanned by a maximal entangled state.
First we dene Kraus operators on d dimensional Hilbert space HK . Let
fjfiigdi=1 be an orthonormal base. Dene operators on HK (Lij)di;j=1 by
(I
dLij)j	i = jfii 
 jfji 2 HA
HK ; (7.13)
where j	i := 1=pdPdi=1 jfii 
 jfii. We nd that (i) fLijgdi;j=1 be an or-
tho\normal"base of L(HK), i.e., hLij jLi0j0iHS = 1=dij;i0j0 holds, since the
linear transpose Eq.(7.13) is the isomorphism between L(HK) andHA
HK ,
(ii)
Pd
i;j=1 L
y
ijLij = I holds since fLijgdi;j=1 is the ortho"nomal" base.
Dene index sets X(J;i) := f(1; J (i)(1)); (2; J (i)(2)); : : : ; (d; J (i)(d))g 
[d]  [d] (i = 1; 2; : : : ; d and J = 1; 2; : : : ;m) as J (i)(l) 6= J (i0)(l) for any
i 6= i0; l and fJ (i)(l) j l 2 [d]g = [d] holds, where [d] := f1; 2; : : : ; dg.
 Remark 4: A size d  d matrix J^ = (Jil := J (i)(l))1i;ld is a Latin
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square, i.e., J^ has d dierent symbols, each occurring exactly once in
each row and each column.
Dene an index set X(0;i) := f(i;m)gdm=1  [d]  [d] (i 2 [d]). We nd
that X(J;i) \X(J;i0) = ; holds for any J and i 6= i0.
Lemma 21 Dene a family of operators M (0) := (M
(0)
i )
d
i=1 as M
(0)
i :=Pd
j=1 Lij and dene M
(J) := (M
(J)
i )
d
i=1 (J = 1; 2; : : : ;m) as M
(J)
i :=P
(j;k)2X(J;i) Ljk, then, jM (0)i fli = ilpd jfi and jM
(J)
i fli = 1pd jfJ(i)(l)i hold
for any i; J 2 [d], where jfi :=Pdj=1 jfji.
Proof For any j; k 2 [d],
dX
l=1
jfli 
 jLjkfli = 1p
d
jfji 
 jfki; (7.14)
holds from eq.(7.13). Form eq.(7.14),
dX
l=1
(I
M (0)i )jfli 
 jfli =
dX
l;j=1
jfli 
 jLijfli
=
dX
j=1
1p
d
jfii 
 jfji
= jfji 

dX
j=1
1p
d
jfji
=
dX
l=1
jfli 
 ilp
d
dX
j=1
jfji;
holds, therefore, we have jM (0)i fli = il=
p
djfi. For any i; J 6= 0,
dX
l=1
(I
M (J)i )jfli 
 jfli =
dX
l=1
X
(j;k)2X(J;i)
jfli 
 jLjkfli
=
X
(j;k)2X(J;i)
1p
d
(I
dLjk)j	i
=
X
(j;k)2X(J;i)
1p
d
jfji 
 jfki
=
dX
j=1
jfji 
 1p
d
jfJ(i)(j)i;
holds from eq.(7.14), therefore, we have jM (J)i fli = 1=
p
djfJ(i)(l)i. 
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Corollary 22 M (J) is a set of measurement operators for any J withPd
i=1M
(J)
i
y
M
(J)
i = I.
Proof We nd that
hflj
dX
i=1
M
(0)
i
y
M
(0)
i jfl0i = hflj
dX
i=1
M
(0)
i
y dX
k=1
jfkihfkjM (0)i jfl0i
=
dX
i;k=1
hfljM (0)i
yjfkihfkjM (0)i jfl0i
=
dX
i;k=1
hfkjM (0)i jflihfkjM (0)i jfl0i
=
dX
i;k=1
hfkj 1p
d
iljfihfkj 1p
d
il0 jfi
=
dX
i;k=1
1
d
ilil0hfkjfihfkjfi
=
1
d
dX
i=1
ilil0hf jfi
=
dX
i=1
ilil0 = ll0 ;
holds. For any J 6= 0,
hflj
dX
i=1
M
(J)
i
y
M
(J)
i jfl0i = hflj
dX
i=1
M
(J)
i
y dX
k=1
jfkihfkjM (J)i jfl0i
=
dX
i;k=1
hfljM (J)i
yjfkihfkjM (J)i jfl0i
=
dX
i;k=1
hfkjM (J)i jflihfkjM (J)i jfl0i
=
dX
i;k=1
hfkj 1p
d
jfJ(i)(l)ihfkj
1p
d
jfJ(i)(l0)i
=
1
d
X
i;k=1
hfJ(i)(l)jfkihfkjfJ(i)(l0)i
=
1
d
X
i=1
hfJ(i)(l)jfJ(i)(l0)i = ll0 ;
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holds. Therefore, we have
Pd
i=1M
(J)
i
y
M
(J)
i = I. 
Consequently, by using our proposal method, Alice can solve Mean
King's problem which consists of sets of measurement operators M (J) for
the 1 dimensional quantum code spanned by the maximal entangled state.
7.6 An Example: A Construction from Computa-
tional Bases
We show an example of measurement operators constructed from the com-
putational base by using the above construction method. Let fjiigd 1i=0 be
the computational bases of d dimensional Hilbert space HK ' Cd, i.e.,
i + 1th element of jii is equals to 1 and the others are equal to 0 for any
i. Dene a d2-tuple of Kraus operators (Lij = (L
(ij)
kl )0k;ld 1)
d 1
i;j=0 by
(I
dLij)j	i = jii 
 jji. Remark that L(ij)kl = 1=
p
d(k;l);(i;j) holds. we
show three kinds of sets of measurement operators constructed from Kraus
operators (Lij)i;j as an instance in 3 dimensional case:
M
(0)
1 =
1p
3
0@1 0 01 0 0
1 0 0
1A ;M (0)2 = 1p
3
0@0 1 00 1 0
0 1 0
1A ;
M
(0)
3 =
1p
3
0@0 0 10 0 1
0 0 1
1A ;
M
(1)
1 =
1p
3
0@1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
1A ;M (1)2 = 1p
3
0@0 1 00 0 1
1 0 0
1A ;
M
(1)
3 =
1p
3
0@0 0 11 0 0
0 1 0
1A ;
M
(2)
1 =
1p
3
0@1 0 00 0 1
0 1 0
1A ;M (2)2 = 1p
3
0@0 1 01 0 0
0 0 1
1A ;
M
(2)
3 =
1p
3
0@0 0 10 1 0
1 0 0
1A :
Table 7.2 denotes index sets related with the relationship between the mea-
surement operators and Kraus operators.
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Table 7.2: The relationship between measurement operators and index sets
J i X(J;i)
0 1 (1; 1); (1; 2); (1; 3)
0 2 (2; 1); (2; 2); (2; 3)
0 3 (3; 1); (3; 2); (3; 3)
J i X(J;i)
1 1 (1; 1); (2; 2); (3; 3)
1 2 (1; 2); (2; 3); (3; 1)
1 3 (1; 3); (2; 1); (3; 2)
J i X(J;i)
2 1 (1; 1); (2; 3); (3; 2)
2 2 (1; 2); (2; 1); (3; 3)
2 3 (1; 3); (2; 2); (3; 1)
7.7 Higher Dimensional Quantum Codes for Bi-
partite System
We show a setting of Mean King's problem which is solved by using 3 di-
mensional quantum error-correcting code toward higher dimensional quan-
tum codes. First, we construct a Mean King's problem which consists of
two projective measurements in 2 dimensional Hilbert space, then, our pro-
posal solution of the problem is a 1 dimensional quantum code spanned by
the Bell state. Let HA;HK be 2 dimensional Hilbert spaces. Dene Kraus
operators (L^i)
4
i=1 with
P4
i=1 L^
yL^i = I as
L^1 := X0Z0; L^2 := X1Z0;
L^3 := X0Z1; L^4 := X1Z1;
where X0 := j+ih+j; X1 := j ih j; Z0 := j0ih0j, and Z1 := j1ih1j. For
projective measurements M^ (1) := (X0; X1); M^
(2) := (Z0; Z1), and the Bell
state j	+i,
X0 = L^1 + L^3; X1 = L^2 + L^4;
Z0 = L^1 + L^2; Z1 = L^3 + L^4;
and
h(IA 
 L^k)	+j(IA 
 L^k0)	+i = 1
4
kk0 ;
hold, where we used a property (I 
 Zi)j	+i = (Zi 
 I)j	+i. Therefore
all the conditions of Theorem 18 are satised for Kraus operators (L^i)i
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with respect to King's measurement M^ (1); M^ (2) and a [4; 1] quantum code
spanned by j	+i.
Lastly, we construct a Mean King's problem from the above discussion,
then, our solution of the problem is 3 dimensional quantum code. Let
HA;HK be 3 dimensional Hilbert spaces and fjiig2i=0 the computational
base of HA and HK . Dene
~X0 :=
0@ 0X0 0
0 0 0
1A ; ~X1 :=
0@ 0X1 0
0 0 0
1A ;
~Z0 :=
0@ 0Z0 0
0 0 0
1A ; ~Z1 :=
0@ 0Z1 0
0 0 0
1A :
Dene Kraus operators ~L1 := ~X0 ~Z0; ~L2 := ~X1 ~Z0; ~L3 := ~X0 ~Z1; ~L4 :=
~X1 ~Z1; ~L5 := j2ih2j, then
P
i
~Lyi ~Li = I holds. Dene measurement opera-
tors ~M (J) := ( ~M
(J)
1 ;
~M
(J)
2 ) (J = 1; 2) as
~M
(1)
1 :=
~L1 + ~L2 = j0ih0j;
~M
(1)
2 :=
~L3 + ~L4 + ~L5 = j1ih1j+ j2ih2j;
~M
(2)
1 :=
~L1 + ~L2 + ~L5 = j0ih0j+ j2ih2j;
~M
(2)
2 :=
~L3 + ~L4 = j1ih1j;
and a [9; 3] quantum code ~C spanned by
fjii 
 (j0i+ j2i) j i 2 f0; 1; 2gg  HA 
HK ;
then,
hij(h0j+ h2j)(I
 ~Lk)y(I
 ~Lk0)jji(j0i+ j2i) = ijkk0kk0ij ;
holds for some ijkk0 2 C. All the conditions of the Theorem 18 hold for
(~Li)i and ~C. Therefore, by using our proposal method, Alice can solve Mean
King's problem which consists of measurement operators performed by King
~M (1) and ~M (2) for any initial state in the [9; 3] quantum code ~C.
7.8 Higher Dimensional Quantum Codes for Com-
posite System
Let us consider that Alice prepares not bipartite system but composite sys-
tem consisted from qubit systems, i.e., she can prepare and keep many qubit
systems secretly. Dene j0i := j1i; j1i := j0i. We call
1p
2
(ji1i2    ini+ ji1 i2    ini) 2 C
n;
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Greenberg-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state [99], where n  3 and il 2 f0; 1g
for any l. Note that the states are equal to the Bell states if we permit
n = 2. Alice prepares a GHZ state gives jth qubit system to Bob. Then,
the remnants are kept by Alice in secret. Let
Z^j = (Zj0 := j0ih0j; Zj1 := j1ih1j);
X^j = (Xj0 := j+ih+j; Xj1 := j ih j);
be projective measurements employed by King 2 on jth qubit system. We
show that we can construct higher dimensional quantum error-correcting
code, which is a solution of Mean King's problem with the above setting,
constructed from GHZ states against error constructed from the measure-
ments employed by King.
Figure 7.5: Preparing a GHZ state and sending one qubit system
Dene Lj := fXjaZjbga;b. Then,
P
a;b (X
j
aZ
j
b )
y
XjaZ
j
b = Ij holds. Further-
more, we obtain
Xj0 = X
j
0Z
j
0 +X
j
0Z
j
1 ; X
j
1 = X
j
1Z
j
0 +X
j
1Z
j
1 ;
Zj0 = X
j
0Z
j
0 +X
j
1Z
j
0 ; Z
j
1 = X
j
0Z
j
1 +X
j
1Z
j
1 :
Therefore, conditions (7.1) and (7.2) of Theorem 18 hold for Z^j ; X^j , and
Lj .
Let j i be a GHZ states on C
n. We use a short notation:
Zja $ I1
    
 Ij 1
Zja 
 Ij+1
    
 In;
Xja $ I1
    
 Ij 1
Xja 
 Ij+1
    
 In;
for any j and a. Using the following equations Zjaj i = Zka j i and Xja0Zka =
ZkaX
j
a0 for any a; a
0 and j 6= k , we obtain
h jZjb1Xja1Xja2Z
j
b2
j i = h jZkb1Zkb2Xja1Xja2 j i
= a1a2b1b2h jZjb1Xja1 j i:
2Zj0 and Z
j
1 are projections corresponding to a Pauli matrix z. X
j
0 and X
j
1 are
projections corresponding to a Pauli matrix x.
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We try to nd GHZ state ji 6= j i such that
h jZjb1Xja1Xja2Z
j
b2
ji = 0; (7.15)
holds. From the above discussion, we obtain the following the equation:
h jZjb1Xja1Xja2Z
j
b2
ji = a1a1b1b2h jZjb1Xja1 ji;
where b1b2 = b1b2 ;  b1b2 , or b1 b2 holds according to jth and kth states. We
show that there exist GHZ states such that eq.(7.15) holds by observing the
following forms:
Zjb1 j i =
1p
2
(ji1i2    ij 1iZjb1 jijijij+1    ini
+ji1 i2    ij 1iZjb1 jijij ij+1    ini); (7.16)
and
Xja1 ji =
1p
2
(jl1l2    lj 1iXja1 jljijlj+1    lni
+jl1 l2    lj 1iXja1 jljij lj+1    lni): (7.17)
Indeed, eq.(7.15) holds if there exist uth qubit states of eq.(7.16) and
eq.(7.17) such that hiujlui = 0 holds. Dene a subset of GHZ states  :=
fji j h jZjb1X
j
a1X
j
a2Z
j
b2
ji = 0; 8a1; a2; b1; b2g and C := span(fj i [ g.
Note that the number of elements of C is equal to 2n 2. Let E be the
projection from C
n into C. Then, condition (7.3) of Theorem 18 holds
since
EZjb1X
j
a1X
j
a2Z
j
b2
E = a1b1a1a2b1b2E;
holds. Therefore, Alice can estimate King's outcome with probability 1 by
using any state of C and C is a [2n; 2n 2] quantum error-correcting code
against spanLj .
Chapter 8
Re-formulation of the
Problem Using Entropy
8.1 Re-formulation of the Problem
We reformulate the general Mean King' problem introduced in Sec.7.1.
In the setting, with given d(= dimHK) and measurements M (k) =
(M
(k)
j )
m
j=0(k = 0; 1; : : : ;m
0) 1, we say that a solution to Mean King's problem
exists if and only if a pair of an initial state and a measurement employed by
Alice exist such that she estimates King's outcome with probability 1. No-
tice that Alice can utilize an entanglement: In step 1, she secretly prepares
an ancilla system and chooses an appropriate entangled state on the bipar-
tite system. In step 3, she performs a POVM measurement P = (Pi)
n
i=0
on the bipartite system. In this section, we reformulate the problem using
conditional Shannon entropy.
Let K;J , and I be random variables expressing the kind of the measure-
ments employed by King, the outcomes obtained by King, and the outcomes
obtained by Alice's measurement P , respectively. Then, we can reformulate
Mean King's problem using the conditional entropy as follows:
Find an initial state  and a measurement P such that
H(J j I;K) = 0; (8.1)
where H( j ) denotes conditional Shannon entropy.
Note that H(J j I) is generally strictly positive, otherwise Alice can guess
King's outcome without a delayed information K. By the chain rule of the
conditional entropy, eq.(8.1) is equivalent to the following relation:
H(K;J j I) = H(K j I); (8.2)
1Note that this notation is slightly dierent for indexes in Sec.7.1: J $ k.
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Let PK;J;I(k; j; i) be a joint probability of K;J; I, and let PK;I(k; i) =P
j PK;J;I(k; j; i) be the marginal joint probability of K and I. We nd
that eq.(8.2) holds if and only if
PK;J;I(k; j; i) = 0 or PK;J;I(k; j; i) = PK;I(k; i); (8.3)
holds for each k; j, and i. Indeed, by the denition of conditional entropy,
we can rewrite eq.(8.2) as follow:
 
X
k;j;i
PK;J;I(k; j; i) logPK;J;I(k; j j i) =  
X
k;i
PK;I(k; i) logPK;I(k j i); (8.4)
where P ( j ) denotes a conditional probability corresponding to the random
variables. If PI(i)(=
P
k;j PK;J;I(k; j; i)) 6= 0 holds, using the monotonically
increasing property logPK;J;I(k; j; i)  logPK;I(k; i), eq.(8.4) holds if and
only if
PK;J;I(k; j; i) logPK;J;I(k; j; i) = PK;J;I(k; j; i) logPK;I(k; i); (8.5)
holds for any k; j, and i. Nothing that PI(i) = 0 holds if and only if
PK;J;I(k; j; i) = 0 for any k and j, eq.(8.4) holds if and only if eq.(8.5)
holds also in this case. Therefore, we have obtained the equivalence between
eq.(8.2) and eq.(8.3). In our setting, a solution to Mean King's problem is
to nd an initial state  and a measurement P such that condition eq.(8.1),
eq.(8.2), or eq.(8.3) holds.
8.2 An Application: Nonexistence of Solutions in
Qubit Setting
In this section, we give an alternate proof 2 of nonexistence of solutions
to Mean King's problem without using entanglement in qubit system. In
the setting, Alice prepares not bipartite system but one qubit in a state .
Recall that qubit is described by 2-dimensional complex vector space C2.
King employs one of three projective measurements,
M (k) = (M
(k)
j = j kj ih kj j)j2f0;1g (k = 0; 1; 2);
where fj kj igj2f0;1g are three kinds of orthonormal bases on C2, e.g., three
pairs of eigenvectors corresponding to the Pauli matrices x; y, and z.
The post measurement state is j kj i if King chose K = k and obtained an
outcome j from the projective postulate. After that, Alice measures qubit
in the post measurement state with a POVM measurement P = (Pi)i2f0;1g.
Then, we obtain the following joint probability,
PK;J;I(k; j; i) = PK(k)h kj jj kj ih kj jPij kj i; (8.6)
2The previous proofs are shown in Ref.[92, 93].
8.2. AN APPLICATION: NONEXISTENCE OF SOLUTIONS IN QUBIT SETTING69
where PK(k) denotes the probability that King chooses the projective mea-
surement M (k). For a xed k, we observe that there are three A, B, and C
of the joint probabilities satisfying eq.(8.6) characterized as follows:
 Type A:
There uniquely exists a pair of outcomes (j; i) such that PK;J;I(k; j; i) 6=
0 holds. PK;J;I(k; j
0; i0) = 0 holds for any (j0; i0) 6= (j; i).
 Type B:
There uniquely exists an outcome j such that PK;J;I(k; j; i) 6= 0 holds
for any i. PK;J;I(k; j
0; i) = 0 holds for j0 6= j and any i.
 Type C:
PK;J;I(k; j; i) 6= 0; PK;J;I(k; j; i0) = 0; PK;J;I(k; j0; i0) 6= 0, and
PK;J;I(k; j
0; i) 6= 0 hold for i 6= i0 and j 6= j0.
In Figure 8.1, we show a complete classication of probability for each type,
where the number of kinds of the probabilities type A, B, and C is 8. Now,
we try to nd  and P such that each three joint probabilities for k = 0; 1; 2
satises any of the above 8 kinds of the probabilities.
By using eq.(8.6), we obtain the equivalent relations for each type and
the joint probability PK;J;I(k; j; i) as follows:
 The joint probability satises type A if and only if
( =M
(k)
0 ; P0 =M
(k)
0 ; P1 =M
(k)
1 ) or
( =M
(k)
0 ; P0 =M
(k)
1 ; P1 =M
(k)
0 ) or
( =M
(k)
1 ; P0 =M
(k)
0 ; P1 =M
(k)
1 ) or
( =M
(k)
1 ; P0 =M
(k)
1 ; P1 =M
(k)
0 ).
 The joint probability satises type B if and only if
( =M
(k)
0 ; P0 6=M (k)0 ;M (k)1 ; P1 6=M (k)0 ;M (k)1 ) or
( =M
(k)
1 ; P0 6=M (k)0 ;M (k)1 ; P1 6=M (k)0 ;M (k)1 ).
 The joint probability satises type C if and only if
( 6=M (k)0 ;M (k)1 ; P0 =M (k)0 ; P1 =M (k)1 ) or
( 6=M (k)0 ;M (k)1 ; P0 =M (k)1 ; P1 =M (k)0 ).
Let us focus on two probabilities PK;J;I(k; j; i) and PK;J;I(k
0; j; i) with k 6= k0.
If both are type A,  =M
(k)
0 orM
(k)
1 holds for k and  =M
(k0)
0 orM
(k0)
1 holds
for k0. Therefore, we cannot construct the probability satisfying a pair of
(type A, type A) 3 . This fact is also derived from construction of P0 and P1.
In a similar way, we cannot construct the probability satisfying any of pairs
of types (type B, type B), (type C, type C), (type A, type B), (type B, type
3PK;J;I(k; j; i) satises type A and PK;J;I(k; j; i) satises type A, then, we use a notation
(type A, type A).
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Figure 8.1: A classication of probability for each type
A), (type C, type A), and (type A, type C). On the other hand, there are 
and P such that the probabilities satisfy any of pairs of (type B, type C) and
(type C, type B). For instance, ( =M
(k)
0 ; P0 =M
(k0)
0 ; P1 =M
(k0)
1 ) satises
(type B, type C). According to the above fact, we obtain H(J j I;K) = 0
for two kinds of the projective measurements M (k) and M (k
0). However,
it turns out that Alice cannot nd a solution for three kinds of projective
measurement as follows: First, from the above discussion, candidates of
possibly pairs are (type B, type C, type B) 4 and (type C, type B, type
C) corresponding to k = 0; 1; 2. However, the rst one,  = M
(0)
0 or M
(0)
1
holds for type B of 1st term and  = M
(2)
0 or M
(2)
1 holds for type B of 3rd
term. Therefore, the rst one is ruled out of the candidate. In a similar
way, the second one is also ruled out of the candidate from a viewpoint of
the measurement P . Thus, we can conclude that H(J j I;K) = 0 dose not
hold for three kinds of the measurements.
4PK;J;I(0; j; i); PK;J;I(1; j; i), and PK;J;I(2; j; i) satisfy type B, type C, and type B,
respectively. Then, we use a notation (type B, type C, type B).
Chapter 9
Security Analysis of
Quantum Key Distribution
9.1 Modied Measurement Schemes
In Mean King's problem introduced in Sec.6.1, King measures the system
with one of the observables X^; Y^ , and Z^, and Alice measures the bipartite
system with R^. On the other hand, in the quantum key distribution protocol
using Mean King's problem proposed by Bub, King uses only X^ and Z^, while
Alice measures R^. It should be noted that R^ is not a unique solution for
Mean King's problem for these two observables. In addition, it is dicult
to realize the measurement of R^, as it has projections on to the entangled
bases jrji (j = 1; 2; 3; 4) 1. In the following, by using the solution introduced
in Section 7.2, we show three observables employed by Alice that also solve
Mean King's problem for X^ and Z^. These observables are rather simple
compared with R^. We apply them to the quantum key distribution and
study their security.
Measurement M^
Dene a family of operators fEkgk on HK by E1 := X0Z0; E2 :=
X0Z1; E3 := X1Z0, and E4 := X1Z1. This family satises
P
k E
y
kEk = I
and is called Kraus operators. Remark that
h	+j(I
Ek)y(I
 E0k)j	+i =
1
4
kk0 ; (9.1)
X0 = E1 + E2; X1 = E3 + E4;
Z0 = E1 + E3; Z1 = E2 + E4;
hold for the Bell state as an initial state j	+i and King's measurements
X^; Z^, where we used a property (I 
XiZj)j	+i = (Zj 
Xi)j	+i. If King
measures the system HK with X^, a post measurement state is proportional
1See in Sec.6.1.
71
72CHAPTER 9. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF QUANTUMKEYDISTRIBUTION
to
(I
X0)j	+i 2 K1 K2; (I
X1)j	+i 2 K3 K4; (9.2)
in accordance with an outcome 0 or 1, where Kk is dened as a subspace
spanned by (I
Ek)j	+i. Note that Kk are orthogonal to Kk0 on fj	+ig for
any k 6= k0 owing to eq.(9.1). Similarly, if he chooses Z^, a post measurement
state is proportional to
(I
 Z0)j	+i 2 K1 K3; (I
 Z1)j	+i 2 K2 K4: (9.3)
The projection operator Mk onto Kk for each k is dened by
M1 := Z0 
X0; M2 := Z1 
X0;
M3 := Z0 
X1; M4 := Z1 
X1:
These operator dene a PVM M^ := (Mk)
4
k=1 on HA
HK . Alice measures
the post measurement state with M^ and obtains an outcome k 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g.
She can estimate King's outcome by using the relationship (see Table 9.1)
between King's observables and her outcome obtained from eq.(9.2) and
(9.3), e.g., if King chooses X^ and Alice obtains an outcome 2, she estimates
King's outcome as 0.
Note that this observable M^ does not contain any entangled PVM element
and is much simpler than R^.
Measurement N^
Dene Kraus operators fE0kgk as E01 := Z0X0; E02 := Z1X0; E03 := Z0X1,
and E04 := Z1X1. We obtain a PVM measurement N^ = (Nk)4k=1 on
HA
HK in a similar way:
N1 := X0 
 Z0; N1 := X0 
 Z1;
N3 := X1 
 Z0; N4 := X1 
 Z1:
Note that Table 9.2 denotes the relationship between King's observables and
N^ .
Measurement L^
Lastly, we dene a POVM L^ := (Lk)
4
k=1 on HA
HK by
L1 :=
1
2
(Z0 
X0 +X0 
 Z0); L2 := 1
2
(Z1 
X0 +X0 
 Z1);
L3 :=
1
2
(Z0 
X1 +X1 
 Z0); L2 := 1
2
(Z1 
X1 +X1 
 Z1):
In Table 9.3, the relationship between King's observables and L^ is denoted.
While this POVM seems complicated than M^ and N^ , it can be realized by
probabilistically choosing M^ and N^ and is simple as well.
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Table 9.1: The relationship between King's observables and M^
M1 M2 M3 M4
X^ 0 0 1 1
Z^ 0 1 0 1
Table 9.2: The relationship between King's observables and N^
N1 N2 N3 N4
X^ 0 0 1 1
Z^ 0 1 0 1
Table 9.3: The relationship between King's observables and L^
L1 L2 L3 L4
X^ 0 0 1 1
Z^ 0 1 0 1
9.2 Setting of Attack Models
We study security of the quantum key distribution protocol with modied
measurement schemes. We introduce three attack models.
We call a quantum channel from Alice to King AK-channel and a quan-
tum channel from King to Alice KA-channel. An eavesdropper Eve attacks
a qubit with unlimited quantum resource on the quantum channels. A pur-
pose of Eve's attack is to obtain information of the secret key without being
detected by Alice and King. Eve can use all the public classical information.
 Attack model 1:
Eve attacks only KA-channel.
 Attack model 2:
Eve attacks only AK-channel.
 Attack Model 3:
There are two eavesdroppers Eve1 and Eve2 who do not communicate
with each other. Eve1 attacks only AK-channel and Eve2 attacks only
KA-channel.
Note that model 3 is the strongest in such a sense that this model can be
reduced to the other models if one of the eavesdroppers does nothing.
We rst consider model 1 and show that the protocols using M^ and N^
are insecure even against this weak attack. Then we introduce our previous
result on the protocol using R^ in the model 2. Model 3 is considered with re-
spect to the modied protocol with L^. By showing a nontrivial information-
disturbance trade-o inequality, we conclude that only this protocol could
be secure in the models introduced above.
74CHAPTER 9. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF QUANTUMKEYDISTRIBUTION
Before we consider security of the protocol, we dene the following con-
ditional probabilities. Let k be a state of the bipartite system after King
measures HK with B^ 2 fX^; Z^g and obtains an outcome k.
P(A^ = i _ A^ = j j B^ = k) := tr kAi + tr kAj ;
denotes a probability that Alice measuresHA
HK in the post measurement
state k with A^ = fAigi 2 fR^; M^ ; N^ ; L^g and obtains i or j. We dene an
error probability which means that Alice dose not estimate King's outcome
perfectly, e.g.,
P(errorM^ j Z^ = 0) := 1  P(M^ = 1 _ M^ = 3 j Z^ = 0):
Figure 9.1: Three attack models
9.3 Security Analysis for Attack Model 1
9.3.1 Measurements M^ and N^
In the attack model 1, Eve makes the system HK interact with her own
system HE on KA-channel. King measures HK which is not performed the
attack by Eve with one of projective measurements. The post measurement
state on HK is jiihij or jjihjj according to King's projective measurement.
Eve prepares a system HE in a state 0 and performs unitary evolution
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WKE on HK 
HE . We denote by  a completely-positive map (CP map)
2 describing the general attack. Then it can be written
(jiihij) :=WKE(jiihij 
 0)W yKE ;
(jjihjj) :=WKE(jjihjj 
 0)W yKE :
Dene
K() := trE(
());
E() := trK(
());
for any state  with partial trace restricted by HE and HK respectively.
Remark that Eve has the state E(jiihij) or E(jjihjj) on HE and sends
Alice one of two states
0i := 

K(jiihij);
0j := 

K(jjihjj);
on HK . Alice takes the bipartite system HA
HK in the state jiihij 
 0i or
jjihjj 
 0j .
Suppose that Alice measures the system with measurement M^ . The
state of HA
HK is jiihij 
 0i if King chooses Z^ and obtains an outcome i,
then, probability that Alice estimates the outcome correctly are
P(M^ = 1 _ M^ = 3 j Z^ = 0) = tr(j0ih0j 
 00(M1 +M3)) = 1;
and
P(M^ = 2 _ M^ = 4 j Z^ = 1) = tr(j1ih1j 
 01(M2 +M4)) = 1:
Therefore, even if Eve gains information of a secret key generated by X^, the
error probability of the secret keys generated by Z^ is zero, i.e., she is not
detected.
Let us consider that Alice employs N^ . The state ofHA
HK is jjihjj
0j
if King chooses X^ and obtains j, then, the probabilities are
P(N^ = 1 _ N^ = 2 j X^ = 0) = tr(j0ih0j 
 00(N1 +N2)) = 1;
and
P(N^ = 3 _ N^ = 4 j X^ = 1) = tr(j1ih1j 
 01(M3 +M4)) = 1:
Therefore, even if Eve gains information of a secret key generated by Z^, the
error probability of the secret keys generated by X^ is zero.
Consequently, Eve gains information of the secret keys without being
detected if M^ or N^ is applied to the protocol.
2Remind that a CP map  : S(H1) ! S(H2) takes two property: completeness and
positivity. For more details in Sec.3.2.
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9.3.2 Measurements L^ and R^
Firstly, we suppose that L^ is applied to the protocol. We have probabilities
of estimating King's outcome perfectly on condition that King chooses Z^:
P(L^ = 1 _ L^ = 3 j Z^ = 0) = 1
2
(1 + h0j00j0i);
P(L^ = 2 _ L^ = 4 j Z^ = 1) = 1
2
(1 + h1j01j1i):
An error probability of the sifted key generated by the measurement Z^ is
P(errorL^ j Z^ = i) =
1
2
(1  hij0ijii): (9.4)
We estimate Eve's information gain by using the relationship between trace
norm and delity.
Denition 23 Trace norm is dened as
k  k1 := sup
kEkop=1
jtr((  )E)j;
for density operators  and , where k  kop denotes operator norm 3.
Remark that 0  k  k1  1 holds and k  k1 = 0 holds if  = . That
is, the trace norm is regarded as distinguishability of two states.
Denition 24 (Ref.[101, 102]). Fidelity is dened as
F (; ) :=
q
1=21=2;
for density operators  and .
Remark that 0  F (; )  1, and F (; ) = 1 holds if and only if  = . Its
value is a kind closeness of two state. The following equation related with
the delity is introduced.
Lemma 25 (Ref.[103, 104]).
F (; ) = inf
fEg:POVM
X

q
p()p(); (9.5)
holds for density operator  and , where p() := tr(E) and p() :=
tr(E).
We obtain the following theorem.
3Dene kAkop := supfkAxk=kxk j x 2 H s:t: x 6= 0g for A : H ! H.
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Theorem 26 If Alice employs the measurement L^,
kE
 j+ih+j)  E(j ih j)k1  2p2 X
i2f0;1g
q
P(errorL^ j Z^ = i); (9.6)
holds for the attack model 1.
The inequality shows that Eve cannot distinguish a secret key generated by
X^ without increasing the error probability of the secret key generated by Z^.
Proof
We use the following inequality [105] to obtain a trade-o between Eve's
distinguishability and the error probability:
kE(j+ih+j)  E(j ih j)k1  2F (K(j0ih0j);K(j1ih1j)): (9.7)
For 00 = K(j0ih0j) and 01 = K(j1ih1j),
F (00; 
0
1) = inffEg:POVM
X

q
tr(00E)tr(01E)

q
tr(00j0ih0j)tr(01j0ih0j) +
q
tr(00j1ih1j)tr(01j1ih1j)
=
q
h0j00j0ih0j01j0i+
q
h1j00j1i)h1j01j1i
=
q
h0j00j0i(1  h1j01j1i) +
q
(1  h0j00j0i)h1j01j1i

p
2
X
i2f0;1g
q
P(errorL^ j Z^ = i); (9.8)
holds, where we use hij0ijii = 2P(errorL^ j Z^ = i)   1 owing to eq.(9.4).
Therefore, eq.(9.6) holds owing to eq.(9.7) and eq.(9.8). 
Suppose that L^ is applied to the protocol. We have probabilities of
estimating King's outcome perfectly on condition that King chooses Z^:
P(R^ = 1 _ R^ = 2 j Z^ = 0) = 1
2
(1 + h0j00j0i);
P(R^ = 3 _ R^ = 4 j Z^ = 1) = 1
2
(1 + h1j01j1i):
An error probability of the sifted key generated by the measurement Z^ is
P(errorR^ j Z^ = i) =
1
2
(1  hij0ijii): (9.9)
Eq.(9.4) is equal to eq.(9.9). Therefore, we obtain the following theorem by
substituting eq.(9.9) to eq.(9.8).
Theorem 27 If Alice employs the measurement R^,
kE
 j+ih+j)  E(j ih j)k1  2p2 X
i2f0;1g
q
P(errorR^ j Z^ = i); (9.10)
holds for the attack model 1.
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9.4 Security Analysis for Attack Model 2
In this section, we analyze security of the protocol to applied R^ and L^ since
the protocol to applied M^ and N^ is not secure against the attack model 1.
Suppose that the measurement R^ is applied to the protocol. For the attack
model 2, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 28 If Alice employs the measurement R^,
I(X; ~XE) 
X
i2f0;1g
P i
Z^
f(P(errorR^ j Z^ = i));
holds, where I(; ) is mutual information, X denotes a random variable
expressing the outcomes of X^, ~XE denotes a random variable expressing
results of the attack, P i
Z^
denotes a probability for King to obtain an outcome
i with Z^, P(errorR^jZ^ = i) denotes an error probability of the secret keys
generated by Z^, and f(x) :=  (1 2x) log(1 2x) 2x log 2x for 0  x  1=2.
Figure 9.2: Function f dened in Theorem 28
The inequality shows that Eve cannot gain information of a secret key gen-
erated by X^ without increasing the error probability of the secret keys gen-
erated by Z^.
Proof
This proof is similar to a kind of security proofs of BB84 protocol. Let
HE0 be an ancillary system prepared by Eve. Eve performs a quantum
operation VKE0 on bipartite system HK 
HE0 :
VKE0 : HK 
HE0 ! HK 
HE0
jii 
 jE1i 7!
X
j
jEiji 
 jji;
where jE1i is a pure state which is prepared by Eve, and jEiji satisesP
jhEij jEkji = ik. Eve sends the system HK to King after she operates
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on the bipartite system. A state on HA
HK 
HE0 after Eve performs the
operation is given by j	AKE0i := (IA
VKE0)(j	+ijE1i). Probability that
King measures the system HK with the measurement Z^ and obtains an
outcome i is given by P i
Z^
:= tr(IA
Zi
 IE0 j	AKE0ih	AKE0 j). Then, a post
measurement state of HK is jiihij, and let ~iZ^ be a state of HA. King returns
the system to HK in the post measurement state to Alice. Probabilities
that Alice estimates King's outcome with probability 1 by measuring the
HA
HK in the state ~iZ^ 
 jiihij with the measurement R^ are
P(R^ = 1 _ R^ = 2 j Z^ = 0) = 1
2
(h0j~0
Z^
j0i+ 1);
P(R^ = 3 _ R^ = 4 j Z^ = 1) = 1
2
(h1j~1
Z^
j1i+ 1):
Therefore, error probability is given by
P(errorR^ j Z^ = i) =
1
2
(1  hij~i
Z^
jii): (9.11)
We consider a virtual setting which Eve (resp. Alice) measures the sys-
tem HE0 (resp. HA) in the state j	AKE0i with an arbitrary (possibly op-
timal) POVM measurement. Let ~Z = ( ~Zj)j and ~X = ( ~X) be POVMs
employed by Alice and Bob, respectively. Then, let j be a post measure-
ment state on HK after Alice and Eve obtain outcomes j and , respectively.
Let Z^(j) (resp. X^(j)) be a probability mass function of obtaining the
outcomes with measurement Z^ (resp. X^) on the state j. By using entropic
entropic uncertainty relation [106] for Z^(j) and X^(j),
H(Z^(j)) +H(X^(j))   2 loge(max
i;j
kZ1=2i X1=2j kop) = 1;
holds. We exchange notations and obtain the following inequality:
H(Z j ~ZA; ~XE) +H(X j ~ZA; ~XE)  1
where Z;X; ~ZA, and ~XE are random variables expressing outcomes of
Z^; X^; ~Z, and ~X, respectively. By using a property of conditional entropy,
H(Z j ~ZA) +H(X j ~XE)  1; (9.12)
holds. Let us consider ~Z = Z^, then, joint probability that King obtains
j by measuring the system with Z^ and King obtains l by measuring the
system with ~Z is given by P ~ZAZ(j; l) = PZ(l)P ~ZAZ(j j l) = P lZ^hjj~lZ^ jji,
where P (; ); P ( j ), and P () are joint probability, conditional probability,
and probability, respectively, corresponding to random variables. Then,
P ~ZAZ(j; l) = h	AKE0 j(Zj 
 Zl 
 IE0)j	AKE0i;
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holds. We obtain
P ~ZA(j) =
X
l
P ~ZAZ(j; l)
=
X
l
h	AKE0 j(Zj 
 Zl 
 IE0)j	AKE0i
= h	AKE0 j(Zj 
 IK 
 IE0)j	AKE0i = 1
2
;
where we use a property of projections
P
l Zl = I and simple calculations 4.
Then,
PZ ~ZA(l j j) =
P ~ZAZ(j j l)
P ~ZA(j)
= 2P l
Z^
hjj~l
Z^
jji;
holds. Therefore, we obtain
H(Z j ~ZA) =
X
j
PZ ~ZA(l j j)H(Z j ~ZA = j)
=
X
j
1
2
X
j
 2P l
Z^
hjj~l
Z^
jji log(2P l
Z^
hjj~l
Z^
jji)
=  
X
j;l
P l
Z^
hjj~l
Z^
jji log(2P l
Z^
hjj~l
Z^
jji) (9.13)
Substituting hjj~j
Z^
jji = 1   2P(errorR^ j Z^ = j) obtained from eq.(9.11) to
eq.(9.13),
H(Z j ~ZA) =  1 +H(Z) +
X
i
P i
Z^
f(P(errorR^ j Z^ = i));
holds. Substituting the above equation to eq.(9.12),
H(X j ~XE)  2 H(Z) 
X
i
P i
Z^
f(P(errorR^ j Z^ = i))
 1 
X
i
P i
Z^
f(P(errorR^ j Z^ = i));
holds, where we use a property of binary entropy 0  H(Z)  1. By
denition of mutual information I(X; ~XE) = H(X) H(X j ~XE),
I(X; ~XE)  H(X)  1 +
X
i
P i
Z^
f(P(errorR^ j Z^ = i))

X
i
P i
Z^
f(P(errorR^ j Z^ = i));
4Thanks to h	AKE0 j(Zj 
 IK 
 IE0)j	AKE0i = h	+jhE1j(IA
V yKE0)(Zj 

IK 
 IE0)(IA
VKE0)jE1ij	+i = h	+j(Zj 
 IK)j	+ihE1jE1i = 1=2.
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holds, where we use the property 0  H(X)  1 once more. It ends the
proof. 
Suppose that Alice measures the system in the state ~i
Z^

 jiihij with the
measurement L^, then, probabilities in which Alice estimates King's outcome
perfectly are
P(L^ = 1 _ L^ = 3 j Z^ = 0) = 1
2
(h0j~0
Z^
j0i+ 1);
P(L^ = 2 _ L^ = 4 j Z^ = 1) = 1
2
(h1j~1
Z^
j1i+ 1):
An error probability is
P(errorL^ j Z^ = i) =
1
2
(1  hij~i
Z^
jii):
The probability is equal to the error probability with the measurement R^
eq.(9.11). Therefore, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 29 If Alice employs the measurement L^,
I(X; ~XE) 
X
i2f0;1g
P i
Z^
f(P(errorL^ j Z^ = i));
holds.
9.5 Security Analysis for Attack Model 3
The model 3 is the most general one among the three attack models. Eve1
takes the system HK on AK-channel. She prepares a system HE0 in a state
jE0i and performs unitary evolution VKE0 onHK 
HE0 as (IA
VKE0)j	+i

jE0i; King measures the system HK with Z^ or X^, then, a post measurement
state of HK is an eigenstate of Z^ or it of X^. On the other hand, a post
measurement state of HA may or may not be an eigenstate of them. Let
iA be a post measurement state of the system HA when King chooses A 2
fX^; Z^g and obtains an outcome i 2 f0; 1g. Eve2 takes the system HK in
the eigenstate on KA-channel and performs the unitary evolution WKE on
HK 
HE similar to the attack model 1. Therefore, Alice takes the bipartite
system HA
HK in the state iZ^ 
 0i or 
j
X^

 0j with the measurement L^
or R^.
Firstly, we consider that Alice employs L^. We have conditional proba-
bilities of estimating King's outcome perfectly when King chooses Z^:
P(L^ = 1 _ L^ = 3 j Z^ = 0) = 1
2
h0j(0
Z^
+ 00)j0i;
P(L^ = 2 _ L^ = 4 j Z^ = 1) = 1
2
h1j(1
Z^
+ 01)j1i:
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An error probability of the sifted key generated by the measurement Z^ is
P(errorL^ j Z^ = i) = 1 
1
2
hij(i
Z^
+ 0i)jii: (9.14)
By substituting 00; 01, and eq.(9.14) to eq.(9.5), we obtain the following
inequality:
F (00; 
0
1) = inffEg:POVM
X

q
tr(00E)tr(01E)

q
tr(00j0ih0j)tr(01j0ih0j) +
q
tr(00j1ih1j)tr(01j1ih1j)
=
q
h0j00j0i(1  h1j01j1i) +
q
(1  h0j00j0i)h1j01j1i

p
2
X
i2f0;1g
r
P(errorL^ j Z^ = i) +
1
2
(hiji
Z^
jii   1)

p
2
X
i2f0;1g
q
P(errorL^ j Z^ = i);
where we use hiji
Z^
jii   1  0. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 30 If Alice employs the measurement L^,
kE
 j+ih+j)  E(j ih j)k1  2p2 X
i2f0;1g
q
P(errorL^ j Z^ = i); (9.15)
holds for the attack model 3.
The inequality also denotes a trade-o relationship between information gain
for Eve1 and error rate.
Secondly, we discuss eect of the operation of Eve1 in this case. In the
case of the model 1, i.e., Eve1 does not perform any operation on HK on
AK-channel, the error probability is represented as eq.(9.4). On the other
hand, the error probability is eq.(9.14) if Eve1 performs an operation. As
eq:(9:14)  eq:(9:4) = 1=2(1  hiji
Z^
jii)  0 holds, Eve1 cannot decrease the
error probability with any quantum operation.
Finally, we consider a case of employing the measurement R^ by Alice.
In this case, probabilities of estimating King's outcome perfectly when King
chooses Z^:
P(R^ = 1 _ R^ = 2 j Z^ = 0) = 1
2
h0j(0
Z^
+ 00)j0i+
i
2
(h1j0
Z^
j0i   h0j00j1i);
P(R^ = 3 _ R^ = 4 j Z^ = 1) = 1
2
h1j(1
Z^
+ 01)j1i+
i
2
(h0j1
Z^
j1i   h1j01j0i):
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holds. For the measurement R^, an error probability corresponding to
P(errorR^ j Z^ = i) is equal to eq.(9.14) if second terms of the above equa-
tions is equal to 0. However, the second terms is generally non zero values.
Therefore, eq.(9.15) may or may not hold for R^.
Remark that the role of X^ is symmetrically with respect to the role of
Z^ in Theorems 26,27,28,29, and 30.
Chapter 10
Summary
In this thesis, we obtained three main results about Mean King's problem
and the quantum key distribution using the problem. The thesis consists
of not only topics of the main results but also introductions of basics of
quantum information theory and so on. We reviewed basics of quantum in-
formation theory in Chapter 3, quantum error-correcting codes in Chapter
4, quantum cryptography in Chapter 5. We introduced conventional set-
ting of Mean King's problem and quantum key distribution protocol as its
application in Chapter 6, and showed the main results after Chapter 6.
In Chapter 7, we proposed a solution to Mean King's problem general-
ized with respect to arbitrary families of measurement operators by using
quantum error-correcting codes. We showed existence of the solution to
the problem in the case that King employs measurements constructed from
mutually unbiased basis of prime-power dimension, then it was show that
the previous work in the same case can be considered from the viewpoint
of quantum error-correcting codes. By constructing settings of the problem
which are dierent from previous setting and are solved by our solution, we
also expanded the class of settings of the problem a solution is existent. In
Chapter 8, we reformulated Mean King's problem using Shannon entropy.
As its application, we gave an alternative proof of nonexistence of solutions
to qubit setting without using entanglement. As a result, we gave infor-
mational insight to the problem. In Chapter 9, we applied measurements
M^; N^ , and L^ which solve Mean King's problem for two observables to the
quantum key distribution protocol. We analyzed security of the protocols
to show that the protocols using M^ and N^ are insecure under a rather sim-
ple attack model. This result implies that measurements solving the Mean
King's problem for two observables are necessary but are not sucient to
construct secure quantum key distribution protocols.
Finally, we expect that new insights from viewpoints of a combination of
quantum estimation problem, quantum error-correcting codes, and quantum
key distribution will be given to quantum information theory, physics, and
84
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information science. As a result, we hope that quantum information theory
is recognized as a bridge between physics and information science, and we
also hope that quantum information theory progresses and has good eect
on not only science but also engineering.
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